



**Evaluation Study  
on  
The EU Institutions & Member States'  
Mechanisms for Promoting  
Policy Coherence for Development**

**Appendix VI  
Case Study Report  
The role of the Comité Interministeriel de la  
Coopération Internationale et du Développement  
in the promotion of PCD in France**

**Client: The Evaluation Services of  
- French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lead agency  
- Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,  
and the European Commission**

May 2007

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# Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>DATA COLLECTION METHODS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>COUNTRY PROFILES.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF MECHANISM.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>MAIN FINDINGS ON EVALUATION QUESTIONS .....</b>	<b>4</b>
5.1	Evaluation question 1: origins .....	4
5.1.1	Effect national debate on coherence had on establishment of PCD mechanisms.....	4
5.1.2	Evidence that international thinking on PCD have influenced mechanisms.....	4
5.1.3	Major ‘agents of change’ advocated for the mechanisms, contributed to its establishment and participate in the further promotion and activities.....	5
5.1.4	Major national or international examples of policy (in)coherence for development which prompted the establishment of the mechanisms.....	5
5.1.5	Dissatisfaction with impact and effectiveness that existing coherence mechanisms have on PCD (limited effects....)	5
5.1.6	Uniqueness of particular PCD mechanisms to a particular national context .....	5
5.1.7	Success in surmounting specific obstacles for setting up PCD mechanisms.....	6
5.2	Evaluation question 2: how does mechanism fit with government systems? .....	6
5.2.1	Mechanisms are in line with the national policy objectives (policy relevance) .....	6
5.2.2	Mechanisms are integrated in the national policy, implementation and practices (institutional relevance) .....	7
5.2.3	Key issues from national political context have been integrated in the selection and design of mechanisms (contextual relevance) .....	7
5.2.4	Mechanisms’ design and actions correspond to their official purpose and take into consideration main pre-conditions (internal relevance).....	7
5.2.5	Mechanisms are in line with the internationally recognised demand for PCD .....	8
5.2.6	Mechanisms’ remit cover main policy sectors relevant for development .....	8
5.3	Evaluation question 3: effectiveness & efficiency.....	8
5.3.1	The design and modus operandi of mechanisms facilitates progress towards intra-governmental PCD.....	9
5.3.2	There is clarity among most relevant actors about the identity, role, specific focus and modus operandi of the mechanisms .....	9
5.3.3	The mechanisms’ activities contribute towards progress on intra-governmental PCD (as per outcomes in logical intervention diagram).....	9
5.3.4	Appropriate levels of resources (human and financial capacity) are provided to ensure full and efficient use of the mechanisms .....	9
5.3.5	PCD mechanisms are strong enough in relation to coherence mechanisms of other policy sectors, or other pressure within broader policy process .....	10

5.3.6	Degree to which combination of three different types of mechanisms takes place and how they support each other (policy statements, administrative and institutional mechanisms and knowledge and assessment mechanisms) .....	10
5.4	Evaluation question 4: strengths & weaknesses .....	11
5.4.1	Mechanisms impact positively on encouraging increasing levels of PCD .....	11
5.4.2	The impact of the PCD mechanisms can be traced back to or linked to a limited number of factors .....	11
5.4.3	Incentives/disincentives perceived or experienced by officials that help or hinder the full application of the mechanisms.....	11
5.4.4	Monitoring & evaluation system contributing to ensuring that mechanisms remain well adapted to their task.....	12
5.4.5	Importance of political back-up as a key factor, relative to others, in ensuring PCD mechanisms have impact.....	12
5.4.6	Informal mechanisms – processes also impact (negatively/positively) on PCD .....	12
5.5	Evaluation question 5: sustainability .....	13
5.5.1	PCD has become entrenched in government thinking and is becoming second nature to policy makers .....	13
5.5.2	Government political commitment to PCD has been sustained over some time and is shared by the major political parties in the country.....	13
5.5.3	Resources are available to keep PCD mechanisms operating as long as needed.....	13
5.5.4	Institutional status and capacity of the on-going mechanisms are clearly established.....	13
5.5.5	Mechanisms have the capacity to adapt and renew themselves in order to meet new or changing demands.....	14
5.5.6	Decreasing opposition to the PCD mechanisms and their continued existence.....	14
<b>6</b>	<b>MAIN FINDINGS ON EVALUATION CRITERIA .....</b>	<b>14</b>
6.1	Relevance .....	14
6.2	Effectiveness .....	14
6.3	Efficiency .....	15
6.4	Impact.....	15
6.5	Sustainability .....	15
<b>7</b>	<b>CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	<b>15</b>
7.1	Main conclusions from EQs.....	15
7.2	Main issues, trends and challenges for evaluation synthesis report .....	16
7.3	Additional conclusions on CICID & PCD .....	16
	<b>ANNEX 1: LIST OF PRINCIPAL OFFICIAL SOURCE DOCUMENTS .....</b>	<b>18</b>
	<b>ANNEX 2: ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT .....</b>	<b>19</b>
	<b>ANNEX 3: PERSONS MET .....</b>	<b>21</b>
	<b>ANNEX 4: COUNTRY PROFILE .....</b>	<b>22</b>

# 1 Introduction

The Heads of Evaluation for External Cooperation of the EU Member States and the European Commission have initiated a series of six evaluation studies focussing on how the Maastricht Treaty precepts of, *coordination, complementarity and coherence* (the '3Cs') have been translated into practice, and with what impact. The current study, one of the six in the series, focuses on '**EU Mechanisms Promoting Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)**'. As part of this evaluation seven different mechanisms that promote coherence have been examined in different parts of the EU to see how they carry out this task and to what effect. This report thus covers the role of one such mechanism in promoting PCD.

This evaluation of PCD mechanisms is being carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI), and PARTICIP GmbH. The evaluation analyses and assesses mechanisms for promoting intra-governmental coherence that have been introduced in the administrations of the Members States and the European institutions since the late 1990s, with the purpose of:

## Objectives of this evaluation:

- a) Judging their relevance and effectiveness, as well as the mechanisms' efficiency, impact and sustainability, in terms of promoting PCD and within their specific contexts;
- b) Formulating proposals to improve the relevance and effectiveness in terms of promoting PCD of the mechanisms analysed, without neglecting their efficiency, impact and sustainability requirements in this role;
- c) Enabling politicians and officials in Member States and in European institutions to learn lessons from experience about effective PCD mechanisms and use these more widely.

The evaluation has been commissioned and is managed by the Evaluation Service of France, with the support of a Steering Group that also includes representatives from the evaluation services of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the European Commission.

A 'PCD mechanism', as the term is used in this Study, is taken to mean a mechanism that is a clearly identifiable object of study with concrete features, such as a name and some terms of reference that include PCD as a purpose even as part of a wider scope. Clarity on who is involved, and defined operating ways, are the other elements that qualify the mechanisms. All the mechanisms have other roles as well, but this study only examines their PCD role and does not pretend to cover any other broader role they may have.

The case studies are intended to give the researchers a livelier grasp of the reality of these mechanisms especially by helping them to understand how they are perceived by stakeholders, and by seeing how they operate in their specific governance system.

The process for selecting the case studies is described in Section 4 of the Desk Study. In choosing the cases a systematic effort was made to choose a selection of different types of mechanisms so as to be able to see at close range how different approaches work and the advantages and disadvantages each one might have. The selection thus includes for example one parliamentary committee, a sector-wide development programme, an external advisory committee, a 'whole of government' approach using a government bill, two different systems of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental committees and an inter-department policy consultation system. Cases are also taken from regions of the EU, from EU institutions and from both larger and smaller member states. Finally there are cases from each of the three different functional types of PCD mechanism identified by the Study in the Inception

Phase: (i) Policy Statements, (ii) Institutional or Administrative mechanisms, and (iii) Knowledge Input and Assessment mechanisms

The main reason for selecting this case study is that during the Country Profiling exercise the CICID was, as it operates at ministerial level and is chaired by the prime minister, the most high level case of an institutional and administrative mechanism. As such it really operates at a political level and has thus both a technical and a political competence which is of interest to the overall study. Finally it was deemed important to have some case studies from the central and southern parts of the EU so that the study did not just look at the experience of northern European countries which at first sight appear to be more advanced on establishing PCD mechanisms.

## 2 Data collection methods

Two team meetings were organised to prepare the field surveys. During the first meeting, the various tools that could be used were analysed and discussed. Two checklists were produced. A detailed list, covering all EQs and judgement criteria which also sought to identify key issues and tools was prepared as well as a shorter one, aimed at ensuring that all key issues would be discussed during the interviews. The list of types of actors to be interviewed was categorised in different families and integrated in a standard methodology for preparing and implementing the case studies. A template for the case study report was also drafted so as to ensure homogeneity of reporting.

After the field survey tools had been completed a first field mission was conducted to ensure the tools worked well and some improvements were made. Thereafter a second full team meeting was convened to brief all the field survey teams on how to use the tools and ensure homogeneity in their use. Instructions for interviews were also given, and a discussion was had on how to prioritise information within the short space of time budgeted for each case study.

To prepare the visits each case study team sent an information note to the principle contact Ministry which was then forwarded to the various other Ministries presenting the aims and the content of the case study work. Potential interviewees were discussed between the field study team and the contact Ministry and then a final programme was drawn up.

The evaluation used semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions as the main information collection tool, and review of background documents on in-country coherence as well as documents related to the specific PCD mechanism. The short period of time allotted to the mission did not allow much time for many consultations with a wide range of stakeholders outside the specific Ministry responsible for managing the PCD mechanism (e.g. parliament, various civil society actors, etc.) but every effort was made to ensure that a representative sample was covered in each case. The two days budgeted for interviews in each country, was in some cases increased a bit where possible to cater for individual circumstances.

Given the limited time available for field work this report represents a snapshot of the background, current practices and future challenges relating specifically to how the mechanism selected performs its role of promoting PCD. It focuses on providing an accurate overview and highlighting main prospective issues relating to this PCD role rather than on detailed information on all actions carried out. In particular readers should note that *no attempt is made to look at any broader role the mechanism might have in addition to that of promoting PCD, except if such a broader role might positively or negatively affect the PCD role.*

One potential bias of the case studies is the high proportion of interviewed staff working in the Ministry responsible for development, compared to the staff of other Ministries. The overall perception may therefore reflect the position of this ministry more than others.

The team of consultants would like to thank the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) and Finance and French Agency for Development (AFD) for their assistance in organising the study and the persons met for their flexibility and their willingness to help.

### 3 Country profiles

During the evaluation's desk study phase, individual 'country profiles' have been prepared for each of the EU Member States and Institutions. This profile describes in a systematic manner the main elements of that Member State or Institution's approach towards promoting policy coherence for development. The profiles include information on the most important policy statements, institutional architecture, the internal division of responsibilities and the identified mechanisms to promote PCD.

The analysis in these profiles, which was based on official public documents, was subsequently verified and where possible enriched through a targeted consultation with key officials in EU Member States. As is mentioned on page 11 of the evaluation's Terms of References, the profiles concern the main objective of the desk study for this evaluation and provide a *'(...) deeper insight of the existing PCD mechanisms, by building on the scoping study. An elaboration of the analytical and comprehensive overview will allow for a better international comprehension and comparison. This phase will also lead to the final selection of the mechanisms for the case studies.'*

The country profile for the case study covered in this report can be found in Annex 4.

### 4 Description of mechanism

The methodology chosen for the evaluation involved the choice of one specific PCD mechanism per country for each case study. The Country Profiles were used to identify the main mechanisms in each country. Thereafter a clear choice was made for one single mechanism that appeared to have the greatest track record and/or potential in PCD matters. This therefore was the basis of the choice made to analyse the inter-departmental Committee for Internal Cooperation and Development (CICID). This mechanism was created in 1998 in the context of a major reform of French development cooperation institutional context and as a tool for promoting dialogue and co-ordination between the major political and institutional actors directly or indirectly concerned by French development co-operation,

Chaired by the Prime Minister, the CICID is composed of the 12 Ministers that relate the most to development co-operation, other Ministers being called to attend the CICID if need be. A representative of the President attends the sessions. The two key Ministries involved in French development cooperation i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry hold regular joint Secretariat meetings to which the French Agency for Development also attends. The CICID meets once a year while its co-Secretariat meets more or less every month / six weeks, the two co-chairs being the Deputies Director General of the relevant DGs in the MFA and the MEFI. At a technical level, the dialogue is ensured on a very regular basis.

Its mission is to define the priorities of the French development cooperation policy and more generally its strategy in terms of development cooperation. The objectives of the CICID do not explicitly refer to ensuring Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). It is only in some recent decision-making of CICID in 2005 and 2006 that PCD issues have taken a more

prominent place. This should be kept in mind while reading the following report on the evidence collected.

The internal coherence of the work of the institutional actors has in recent years been reinforced by the new budgetary approach (LOLF- Loi d'Orientation pour la législation financière) to the preparation of the annual finance bill and also by the introduction of the DPT- Document de Politique Transversale) that accompanies the bill. These two innovations have supported the work of the CICID notably in the area of PCD.

## 5 Main findings on evaluation questions

### 5.1 Evaluation question 1: origins

*To what extent and why did the process of establishing the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms respond to specific constraints and produce mechanisms that are particularly suited to these parameters?*

#### 5.1.1 Effect national debate on coherence had on establishment of PCD mechanisms

As explained in the short description of the country profile (part 3), several initiatives have emerged in recent years in France which in one way or another have an indirect impact on the PCD debate. However, there was general agreement among interviewees that there is not yet an in-depth, sustained national debate on policy coherence and this for different reasons: it is not picked up strongly by French civil society - which is rather split on this issue since it represents various interests, MPs do not raise this issue in a systematic and structured manner in their questions/reports, topics that could be the object of a PCD debate are often perceived as "European topics" (trade, agriculture) and thus not the subject of a wide national debate. This is the reason why PCD emerges as an issue of the national debate in a rather ad hoc manner (i.e. following the publication of the Centre for Global Development Index on Policy coherence) or through rather small references in French key policy documents (document de politique transversale). As a consequence of this, thinking on French PCD issues does not take place in the public arena. So far the emerging debate on that issue seems to take place mainly among development specialists. One of the reasons why there is relatively little debate in France on policy coherence relates to the EC competence in several of the areas relating to PCD (trade, agriculture, fisheries immigration,...). There seems to exist an implicit acceptance that these issues can and should be addressed at the Community level. However, one should not forget that European coherence ultimately depend of what EU member states want to make out of it. In that respect a more pro-active French national debate on PCD might be able to influence change at the EC level.

#### 5.1.2 Evidence that international thinking on PCD have influenced mechanisms

The increased international thinking on PCD has given a major "push" to the PCD debate in France. Key factors that have contributed to this were: the OECD/DAC Peer Review, the European debate on PCD and the increased priority given by successive EU Presidencies to the PCD debate. The 2007 cross-cutting policy document on development cooperation (DPT) mentions these elements as push factors for the PCD debate in France. Interestingly, the debate on global public goods has also contributed to raising awareness on PCD. Clearly this debate is perceived to be more "attractive" for the public at large because of the notion of "shared interest". It is an important part of the last CICID decision (2006). It should also be

mentioned that the budgetary approach of the LOLF, in principle, also allows to apply coherence objectives that are translated in the DPT.

### **5.1.3 Major 'agents of change' advocated for the mechanisms, contributed to its establishment and participate in the further promotion and activities**

The case of France is particular: there is not yet a mechanism with a specific mandate to ensure PCD. Yet it is an emerging debate in France and agents of change can be identified in that respect: some officials within the three major development actors (MFA, MEFI, French Agency for Development) try to raise awareness around the policy mix approach including through the Global Public Goods debate that is now receiving a lot of public attention in France and appears to many as a more realistic way to push the PCD issue. In that respect French civil society, research centres and the Parliament hold the potential to become agents of change but, so far they do not seem to have exploited the various opportunities to play a more prominent role.

As far as the establishment of CICID is concerned, the main driver has been institutional: it has been created in the framework of the institutional reform of 1998 as a way to increase inter-ministerial coordination and dialogue among key institutional actors dealing with development cooperation in France.

### **5.1.4 Major national or international examples of policy (in)coherence for development which prompted the establishment of the mechanisms**

As mentioned before, cases where policy (in)coherence for development have been the topics of public national debate have been rather ad hoc. One recent example that has been cited by many interviewees was the publication of the Centre for Global Development Index on coherence for development. France was badly ranked according to this Index and this was picked up by the press. Several French actors, including the Deputy Minister for development cooperation have criticised the criteria used by the global development index. On other issues, such as the debate on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its implications for the developing world, there seems to be less debate in France compared to other countries. Obviously there are important national interests (e.g. of agricultural producers) at stake but agriculture is generally perceived as an area of Community competence which needs to be tackled at that level.

### **5.1.5 Dissatisfaction with impact and effectiveness that existing coherence mechanisms have on PCD (limited effects...)**

At present, no mechanism exists in France to specifically address PCD. Some mechanisms, such as the CICID or more informal networks, start addressing it on an ad hoc basis and limited manner. The existing CICID could be complemented by other mechanisms addressing PCD such as the Secrétariat Général aux Affaires européennes (SGAE). In addition inter-ministerial meetings could address PCD in a more systematic when concrete cases of incoherence would emerge.

### **5.1.6 Uniqueness of particular PCD mechanisms to a particular national context**

The CICID is recognized as a mechanism that is well integrated into the French national context. Diverse inter-ministerial committees have been created around different topics, (e.g. on the Inter-Ministerial Council for Co-operation and Migration- CICI, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for State Resources abroad-CIMEE and the High-level Council for Co-operation and research- HCCR which is composed of officials of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and the Ministry of Research). These French inter-departmental coordination mechanism integrate all relevant policy-makers at the appropriate level (ministerial with potential arbitration by the Prime Minister).

### **5.1.7 Success in surmounting specific obstacles for setting up PCD mechanisms**

At the beginning, the CICID had to gain some legitimacy in the French institutional system. Since 2002, it has been very active in actually carrying out and providing the key orientations in terms of reform of the development cooperation institutional architecture.

With regard to PCD, most interviewees feel that the CICID will be what the highest political levels in France want to make out of it in the future. In this respect it seems particularly important that the Presidential candidates for the future Presidential elections reflect upon the role and place of CICID in the French political arena

#### **Overall finding for EQ 1 - summary box**

In France, there has been little public debate yet on policy coherence for development: civil society and Parliaments rarely address these issues. International thinking and debate on PCD have led to the emergence of a debate on that issue. The European debate as well as the debate on global public goods has contributed to this. The establishment of CICID in 1998 has taken place in the context of a reform aiming at rationalizing the institutional framework of French development cooperation. However it has only indirectly and in an ad hoc manner addressed the issue of PCD.

## **5.2 Evaluation question 2: how does mechanism fit with government systems?**

***How and why are the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms relevant in promoting intra-governmental PCD in their particular national context?***

### **5.2.1 Mechanisms are in line with the national policy objectives (policy relevance)**

The CICID corresponds to national policy objectives since it is part of its mandate to discuss French development cooperation policy. Its mandate is:

- to define the Priority zone for French development cooperation,
- to identify the strategic orientations of French development cooperation policy both at the bilateral and multilateral levels
- to ensure the coherence of sectoral and geographical priorities of French development cooperation
- to monitor the conformity of development cooperation policies and instruments to the pre-defined objectives of French development cooperation
- to identify focal sectors.

As mentioned before, its mandate does not explicitly make reference to ensure PCD, which has only emerged very recently as an issue in French development cooperation policy. Increasing attention is now being attached to PCD including in the 2006 cross-cutting policy document (DPT) and in the CICID decisions of 2005 and 2006.

### **5.2.2 Mechanisms are integrated in the national policy, implementation and practices (institutional relevance)**

The CICID is well integrated in the French institutional and administrative context. It involves all Ministers whose mandate and policies have a direct or indirect impact on development. As explained before, there are many inter-departmental committees dealing with cross-cutting topics and the fact that the CICID is chaired by the Prime Minister also allow for decisions to be made when disagreements arise.

The CICID is also well articulated within the institutional set up dealing with development cooperation, by associating the two key players (MFA and MEFI) in its co-secretariat that meets very regularly as well as the AFD / FAD (French Agency for Development). According to most interviewees, this has been a key factor to ensuring a better coordination and to facilitating the dialogue among these actors.

However, on the reverse side, it should also be mentioned that CICID meets only once a year, which, inevitably limits its action to political and strategic decision-making. The July 2004 CICID decision has entrusted the co-secretariat with a stronger role by designating in each relevant Ministry a CICID liaison person. The co-Secretariat (composed of MFA, MEFI, FAD) meets on a regular basis but these meetings do not involve the other relevant Ministers that should be concerned by PCD. At technical level the dialogue on PCD therefore remains limited to development actors only. The interest of other ministries into CICID seems relatively weak.

### **5.2.3 Key issues from national political context have been integrated in the selection and design of mechanisms (contextual relevance)**

As mentioned earlier, the CICID includes the Ministries whose policies have an impact on development. Any other relevant Minister can attend a CICID session if necessary.

The CICID only includes Ministerial actors.

The Non State Actors, concerned by development, (civil society, private sector) and Members of Parliament, are part of an advisory committee (Haut Conseil pour la Coopération Internationale-HCCI) that is formally linked to the Prime Minister and that has been created in 1998.

Initially the HCCI was perceived to be an advisory council, created by CICID, with a certain impact on French development cooperation. This was mainly due to the commitment expressed to the HCCI by the then Prime Minister. During the first years of its existence the HCCI has done important analytical work on PCD.

As said earlier, content-wise PCD is not explicitly mentioned as a part of the CICID's mandate. However, the issue of PCD has emerged sporadically on the political agenda. This has been the case with the issue of migration and the linkages with development during the June 2006 CICID session. It should be mentioned that there are also other areas that have been addressed by CICID in the past years with a linkages to the policy coherence debate: co-development, sustainable development, integration of LDCs in the world economy, compensation mechanisms for loss of customs revenue, untying of aid, alternative modalities for development finance, etc..

### **5.2.4 Mechanisms' design and actions correspond to their official purpose and take into consideration main pre-conditions (internal relevance)**

The decision creating the CICID lays down a certain number of tasks that are in line with its main objective: to define French development cooperation objectives and strategy.

### **5.2.5 Mechanisms are in line with the internationally recognised demand for PCD**

Those responsible for the CICID within the main Ministries dealing with development issues (MFA and MEFI) are aware of international debates on PCD, mainly through the European debates on that issue, the OECD/DAC Peer Review and some more ad hoc perspectives such as the CGD index. As mentioned earlier, the mandate of the CICID does not explicitly refer to PCD, neither does it refer to European commitments on PCD or MDGs although there is an awareness of the European documents and international commitments on this question. Somehow, although it would have the potential to be so if it had an appropriate mandate, the CICID cannot be considered yet as a mechanism in line with other mechanisms dealing explicitly with PCD in other countries.

### **5.2.6 Mechanisms' remit covers main policy sectors relevant for development**

The CICID includes all relevant Ministries that are linked or have an impact on development. The broad scope of the mechanism can be assessed by the fact that twelve Ministries are represented. However, according to most interviewees and to its constitutive act, it lacks a clear policy mandate to intervene in a systematic manner on this issue. If migration and development has been tackled during the last CICID session, it has insufficiently and not systematically addressed the issues of trade and development and security and development for instance.

Progress has been made on less sensitive issues such as research and higher education with discussions on how to target research on topics related to development and integrate foreign students in the French academic system, which have also been addressed in the last CICID's decisions.

#### **Overall finding for EQ 2 - summary box**

The CICID is well integrated in the French institutional and administrative culture, being an inter-departmental coordination body chaired by the Prime Minister and assembling all relevant Ministries. Actors such as the civil society or Parliamentarians do not have a direct input into this mechanism which is also in line with the fact that they have a relatively weak influence on this issue and embodies French centralism. The CICID lacks however a clear policy mandate in order to intervene on PCD issues and if it has contributed to increase the dialogue between the main institutional actors on development issues (MFA, MEFI and FAD), it does not seem to be the case with other Ministries since there are no regular meetings foreseen at a technical level. It has so far tackled the issue of migration and development in terms of policy mix as well as less sensitive issues such as research and higher education. If it is clearly well integrated into the governmental decision-making process, it might also benefit from stronger linkages with multi-stakeholder mechanisms such as the HCCI. In that respect it could be recommended to ensure that there is a clear and systematic linkage between CICID and HCCI. Surprisingly this link has not yet been formalised, in spite of the HCCI reporting to the French Prime Minister.

### **5.3 Evaluation question 3: effectiveness & efficiency**

***How effective and efficient are the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms in achieving their objectives within their context? In cases where governments have established several intra-governmental PCD mechanisms, to what extent and how do these mutually reinforce each other or do they perhaps work at cross purposes in some respects?***

### **5.3.1 The design and modus operandi of mechanisms facilitates progress towards intra-governmental PCD**

There seems to be no difficulty in the CICID doing its work and implementing its mandate. The CICID has clearly had an impact on the coherence among institutional development actors (MFA, MEFI and FAD) and the regular dialogue among these actors has contributed to smoothing the relationship among them. However it is a rather heavy and slow mechanism since it only meets once a year. Its co-Secretariat provides a more regular instrument (meetings more or less every six weeks and regular dialogue at a technical level in between) .

The co-Secretariat is not a permanent body (monthly alternance between the MFA and the MEFI), which means there is not one designated body responsible for ensuring its continuity and centralising the knowledge and discussions emanating from the meetings of the co-secretariat. In addition it only regroups the 'like-minded' development actors and does not associate non-development Ministries.

### **5.3.2 There is clarity among most relevant actors about the identity, role, specific focus and modus operandi of the mechanisms**

There is a good understanding among relevant actors about the role, the aim and the workings of the CICID. Most interviewees have also indicated quite clearly that ensuring PCD was not the objective of the CICID although it has lately started to address this issue, namely through its last decision in June 2006 on migration. This opinion was especially supported by MFA and MEFI officials although many highlighted that the question of migration was not necessarily approached from a PCD point of view but more from a "shared interest" perspective. It is up to the leadership of the Government and the President to provide a more explicit mandate to the CICID in that respect.

### **5.3.3 The mechanisms' activities contribute towards progress on intra-governmental PCD (as per outcomes in logical intervention diagram)**

The CICID has been only one of the contributors to the emergence of the PCD debate in France and not the main one, according to most interviewees. Indeed the international debate on PCD as well as on global public goods seems to have had more of an impact on this issue. The MFA has also been a key player in that respect with introducing key references to PCD in the first cross-cutting policy document on development (Document de Politique transversale) in 2006 (last chapter) as well as including it in the draft 2007 policy document. There are strong expectations that the annual reporting that is expected on the basis of this policy document and the implementation of the LOLF (Institutional Act on Finance Legislation) will broaden the debate on PCD. Some informal networks chaired by the MFA on specific issues, i.e. "trade and development", "migration and development", "agriculture and development" have also contributed to tackle that debate at a more technical level among the Ministries.

Officials were divided on the effect the CICID actually has had in terms of policy change on PCD. Indeed if most agreed that its latest decisions had opened up an opportunity for it to tackle the PCD issue through migration, many supported the view that this was dependant on the political agenda and that its impact would be strongly correlated to the political strength of the Ministers.

### **5.3.4 Appropriate levels of resources (human and financial capacity) are provided to ensure full and efficient use of the mechanisms**

Appropriate resources have been allocated to the CICID and especially to the running of its co-Secretariat. Officials dealing with the CICID within the MFA and the MEFI have been

clearly identified. Within other ministries there seems to be less involvement. However, the CICID could be strengthened by having a more identified capacity in terms of assessing the impact of its decisions. Some officials have indeed pointed out the lack of public policy evaluation culture in France as a weakening factor.

### **5.3.5 PCD mechanisms are strong enough in relation to coherence mechanisms of other policy sectors, or other pressure within broader policy process**

This is quite difficult to judge since the CICID works a bit in a development sector bubble, especially since its co-Secretariat – that meets regularly – only involves the main development institutional actors. The fact that the directorate of the MEFI that deals with development issues also works on trade related issues certainly ensures a stronger commitment of trade experts to the working of the CICID and a higher awareness of development issues compared to other Ministries.

The strength of such a coordination mechanism is very much linked to the political weight of the Minister dealing with the issue at stake (in this case development). Development has a certain political weight at the moment because of the President's interest in this issue – which is a key factor in the French institutional system – however decisions between conflicting interests are taken on an ad hoc basis (depending on the topics) and this might also change with the Presidential and legislative elections in 2007. In other words: the flexibility of the French policies towards the developing world can be a double edged sword. CICID may well be able to adapt to political alternation but it is also very much dependent of the (sometimes ad hoc) impulses provided by the French Presidency.

### **5.3.6 Degree to which combination of three different types of mechanisms takes place and how they support each other (policy statements, administrative and institutional mechanisms and knowledge and assessment mechanisms)**

The CICID is a valuable institutional mechanism. It should, however, be mandated or entrusted itself as a high level political organ, with a strong policy statement that puts PCD upfront as one of its key priorities. The DPT and LOLF now provide this opportunity. Equally important is to strengthen CICID at the technical level through its co-secretariat. Also, in terms of knowledge assessment and analytical capacities, existing mechanisms such as the HCCI could be better used to feed in that debate and bring a more multi-stakeholder perspective.

#### **Overall finding for EQ 3 - summary box**

CICID is quite a heavy mechanism since it only meets once a year. Its co-secretariat is much more functional but only involves development institutional actors. It could probably be further improved by strengthening the workings of the co-secretariat, having regular meetings at the level of Directors of Cabinets several times during the year and by increasing some analytical/assessment capacities, especially on PCD if the CICID were to be given a specific mandate on that issue or to take the initiative on coherence without such a specific mandate.

In terms of effectiveness, there is a strong case to be made on its impact on the dialogue and the coherence among development institutional actors. As far as PCD is concerned, as long as a clear mandate is not provided to the CICID to address this issue, then effectiveness of the CICID in treating this issue cannot really be measured.

## **5.4 Evaluation question 4: strengths & weaknesses**

***What are the key factors contributing to the success of the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms and their impact on intra-governmental PCD and why? What are the mechanisms' strengths and weaknesses in this respect?***

### **5.4.1 Mechanisms impact positively on encouraging increasing levels of PCD**

Impact is quite difficult to measure in that area. However it is quite clear that the CICID has had an impact in terms of increasing the coordination among French institutional development actors (MFA, MEFI and FAD) by reforming their role and tasks in relation to development cooperation and by increasing the dialogue among these actors. However, impact is much less evident when it comes to intra-governmental PCD since only recent decisions were related to it. There is a tendency to assume that increased coordination at the end of the day will lead to increased coherence. Whether this is the case can not be proven but overall there was a feeling among most that the CICID's recent decisions have contributed to raising PCD in France.

### **5.4.2 The impact of the PCD mechanisms can be traced back to or linked to a limited number of factors**

The impact of the CICID on intra-governmental PCD not being clearly established yet, it is impossible to trace back to key factors. When looking at its impact on increasing coherence among development cooperation institutional actors, it clearly appears that it is very much linked to a political will to carry out this reform as well as the regular involvement of the three main actors into the co-Secretariat. The fact that all Ministries whose actions relate somehow to development cooperation are Members of CICID could certainly be an asset to address intra-governmental PCD issues at a strategic level if this was also translated at a technical level into more regular meetings with these Ministries and a better linkage with some other mechanisms.

Concrete examples of ensuring PCD seem to be more dependent on a strong political backing (especially the President's backing as in the case of the additional tax on flight tickets; see question 5.4.5) or when there is a shared interest, such as in the case of cotton (no conflict of interest between the French industry and developing countries' interests).

If migration and development has been the topic of last CICID's decision, it is also because migration is high on the French political agenda. Some have underlined that the outcome of this debate was more linked to the political weight of each Minister than anything else. However, the existence of CICID has allowed for this topic to be tackled from a different perspective.

### **5.4.3 Incentives/disincentives perceived or experienced by officials that help or hinder the full application of the mechanisms**

A major incentive to French officials could be to ensure that there is regular exposure to PCD initiatives undertaken by other EU member states. A more regular exchange of experiences of what has worked and what does not work in practice could be helpful in creating a 'culture of coherence' in the different ministries.

#### **5.4.4 Monitoring & evaluation system contributing to ensuring that mechanisms remain well adapted to their task**

No formal monitoring or evaluation system is in place at this time regarding CICID. The co-secretariat ensures the follow-up of CICID's decisions but there is no evaluation foreseen. Some interviewees suggested that CICID's work and decisions should be reported to the Parliament in order to increase its accountability. It has been underlined by some interviewees that there is a weak culture of public policy evaluation in France. From a broader perspective, the introduction of the LOLF (Institutional Act on Finance Legislation) could have some impact in terms of monitoring of the effectiveness of French development cooperation: indeed it has been introduced in 2006 and in May 2007, the first report on annual performance is expected and should be presented to the Parliament. One of the suggestions made was that this report could include a specific section on PCD or a specific annual report on how France ensures PCD could be prepared and discussed at the Parliament if a strong political commitment in favour of PCD were to be taken. Specific case studies also appear like a good way of tackling this issue.

#### **5.4.5 Importance of political back-up as a key factor, relative to others, in ensuring PCD mechanisms have impact**

In the absence of a specific mandate to address the PCD issue in a structural manner, the political backing is a key element to ensure that PCD issues are more systematically addressed. As explained before, political backing is key in the case of PCD: in case of conflicting interest, decisions are taken by the Prime Minister and/or the President. At the moment PCD depends more on the political will and interest than on mechanisms. Presidential initiatives have proved to be particularly key in that respect. The proposal for a tax on flight tickets is a good example of that: the transport Ministry was against this idea but since there was a strong Presidential support, it was adopted and France has been promoting this idea among other countries. The development dimension of EPAs and more widely trade and development (with the 2003 Presidential initiative for trade in Africa which led France to push the international community to take into account Africa's specificities when negotiating trade agreements) has also been mentioned as a topic where the President has strongly engaged. In general therefore, Presidential initiatives have been given a concrete and serious follow-up by CICID and the operational levels

#### **5.4.6 Informal mechanisms – processes also impact (negatively/positively) on PCD**

Informal networks inside the administration, such as those on "trade and development" and "migration and development" seem to have contributed to widening the debate on PCD and increasing the dialogue on that issue among a wider group of officials. Of course the impact of these networks remains relatively limited given their informal character and their lack of real decision making power. However, in terms of raising awareness of officials in the various Ministries on sectoral issues related to PCD, these informal initiatives may play an important role.

#### **Overall finding for EQ 4 - summary box**

Impact is quite difficult to assess in the case of the CICID on the intra-governmental coherence. Since it has only recently taken position on some issues such as migration and development, it is impossible to assess the impact of these decisions. Yet it would seem that the CICID has contributed to raising PCD issues in France although in a rather modest manner. However, on an ad hoc basis certain issues related to coherence have been receiving high-level political support, including the concerns expressed by the President on the trade and development debate or regarding the tax on the flight tickets.

The CICID holds an interesting potential to become a relevant and inclusive formal high-level mechanism provided that it is complemented by follow-up mechanisms at the technical level that can ensure a day-to-day follow-up of coherence issues and that also a bottom-up approach can be promoted by involving a broad range of French actors and stakeholders in the debate on coherence

## **5.5 Evaluation question 5: sustainability**

***What (and why) are the main factors influencing the sustainability of the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms?***

### **5.5.1 PCD has become entrenched in government thinking and is becoming second nature to policy makers**

PCD is an emerging debate in France with some actors being more aware of it than others, in particular within the departments of the MFA dealing with development cooperation and European affairs. The PCD debate is recognised to some extent in non-development oriented parts of the government mainly through an increasing pragmatic notion of “shared interest”, which can also be used to defend development related spending when the budget is discussed within the government and at the Parliament. Insufficient evidence was collected to make a well informed judgement on attitudes towards PCD beyond the officials dealing with development, but it would seem that there are indications of increased awareness within other departments than the ones dealing with development.

### **5.5.2 Government political commitment to PCD has been sustained over some time and is shared by the major political parties in the country**

Formal recognition of PCD as an issue is starting in France. The first development cross-cutting document (DPT) has recognised PCD as one of the key issues for development cooperation, in line with the international debate, but no clear overall political commitment has been expressed so far nor have the mechanisms been created that deal particularly with PCD issues. The impression exists of a more ad hoc approach to PCD issues based on impulses that are being given by the top leadership of the country. It should be stressed again in this respect that the French system is highly responsive to Presidential initiatives and that the way PCD issues are promoted also depends on the political weight of each Minister.

### **5.5.3 Resources are available to keep PCD mechanisms operating as long as needed**

Neither the MFA nor the MEFI show any indications of cutting down resources devoted to the functioning of the CICID co-secretariat. The CICID now exists for eight years and nobody seems to question its existence within the French administration.

### **5.5.4 Institutional status and capacity of the on-going mechanisms are clearly established**

As mentioned before, the CICID has been there since 1998. It has been created under a Socialist government, but has survived the switch to a conservative government and everybody seems to recognise its value and capacity in ensuring greater coordination among the main institutional actors dealing with development cooperation and provide strategic directions to the French development cooperation policy alongside other mechanisms such as the COSP (Conference d'Orientation Strategique et de Pilotage) chaired by the Deputy

Minister for development cooperation. Institutional linkages between the CICID and other mechanisms that could also be more involved in the coherence debate, such as the HCCI, could be further strengthened though. A high-level political body such as CICID needs to be able to be fed on a permanent basis by analysis and expert views of advisory, practical research bodies and civil society organisations

#### **5.5.5 Mechanisms have the capacity to adapt and renew themselves in order to meet new or changing demands**

The CICID has clearly won its place in the institutional architecture dealing with development cooperation and PCD could actually be one of the tests to see whether the CICID could be used for broader issues than its original mandate. As mentioned before, it has started doing so in its last decisions but it is too early to say whether this will become a key component of its mandate.

#### **5.5.6 Decreasing opposition to the PCD mechanisms and their continued existence**

There is no opposition to the continuing existence of the CICID although as mentioned previously, it does not formally deal with PCD issues yet. There is certainly recognition that the CICID could be playing a stronger role along with other mechanisms on PCD.

#### **Overall finding for EQ 5 - summary box**

PCD is an emerging debate in France that is only indirectly addressed in the CICID. Nobody seems to question the future of the CICID that has already survived the switch from a socialist government to a conservative one. Its added value in promoting greater coordination among French institutional actors dealing with development cooperation is widely recognized. This mandate is also giving it the necessary weight to carry out the second set of reforms of the French institutional architecture for development.

The CICID's potential in dealing with PCD issues along with other existing mechanisms is also recognized, especially since its last decision on migration. What seems to be needed now is that the CICID should be given the formal mandate to systematically look into issues of PCD

## **6 Main findings on evaluation criteria**

### **6.1 Relevance**

The establishment of CICID in 1998 has taken place in the context of a reform aiming at rationalizing French development cooperation institutional framework and it has proven its relevance in that context. It has been touching on PCD in an ad hoc manner so far and has not yet entrusted itself with a strong role as a watchdog on PCD issues. It should also be mentioned that in France, there has been relatively little public debate yet on policy coherence for development. CICID could play the role of a catalyst in building high-level political commitment towards PCD and in mobilising public and private actors in France on PCD issues. In that respect CICID would certainly increase its relevance in the PCD debate

### **6.2 Effectiveness**

In terms of effectiveness, there is a strong case to be made on entrusting CICID with a more systematic follow-up of PCD cases. A high-level political forum such as CICID should also

give the necessary thought to enhancing inter-actions with other mechanisms that in one way or another deal with PCD, both at the official and non-official levels. While CICID has not always been effective in addressing PCD issues in a structured way, it should be recognized that, indirectly, it has been quite effective in pointing to the importance of PCD in French policies.

### **6.3 Efficiency**

The efficiency of the CICID mechanism could probably be further improved by increasing specific analytical capacities on PCD. In that respect it would be good to analyse specific cases of (in)coherence and ways of tackling these. Here CICID could call upon the analytical capacities and expertise of practical research institutes and advisory bodies such as HCCI. CICID could also invest more in organising public debate on PCD in France beyond the governmental level.

### **6.4 Impact**

Impact is quite difficult to assess in the case of the CICID on the intra-governmental coherence. Beyond the traditional French development actors, CICID has been able to generate awareness of the implications of French policy incoherence for the developing world. But also other factors than the CICID's action have contributed to raise awareness on PCD issues, such as the international and European debates on PCD. The fact that the CICID assembles all relevant Ministers whose actions are related to development somehow would make it the most suitable mechanism to deal with PCD. Appropriate measures should be taken to reinforce the dialogue at a technical level among development related Ministries and sectoral Ministries and a better linkage should be ensured between the CICID and other mechanisms. Political backing exists on an ad hoc manner on this issue and depends on the topics. Political backing is a key factor for a significant impact to be achieved.

### **6.5 Sustainability**

The CICID has proven to be a sustainable mechanism surviving the alternation of political power in France. It has established its added value in promoting greater coordination among French institutional actors dealing with development cooperation is widely established as well as in carrying out the second set of reforms of the French institutional architecture for development. Its potential to address PCD issues along with other mechanisms is recognized.

## **7 Conclusions**

### **7.1 Main conclusions from EQs**

The debate on PCD is gaining momentum in France. Internally some Presidential initiatives and the CICID as inter-governmental body, have contributed to raising awareness on this issue at the highest political level. Externally the international and especially European debates on PCD have also played an important role in broadening the debate on PCD to a variety of French actors and stakeholders. In terms of enhancing the case of PCD in French policy making, the evaluation carried out suggests, three key steps:

- *First of all*, what seems to be needed now is to ensure that the PCD issue can be more systematically addressed at the highest political levels of the State. This could possibly be done by broadening the mandate of the CICID by explicitly giving it a mandate to ensure coherence of French policies vis-à-vis the developing world. Both the DPT and the LOLF can be important tools in this respect.
- *Second* at a more technical level, inter-ministerial structures need to be broadened and strengthened (e.g. co- secretariat CICID). A strong co-secretariat entrusted with a clear mandate can do the day to day follow-up of the PCD issues by preparing practical analysis and organising sensitisation actions on PCD, particularly in the ministries that are not directly dealing with development.
- *Third*, it also seems essential to strengthen bottom-up approaches to PCD. This means: ensuring that French NSAs are participating more in the public debate on PCD, analysis on specific case studies, more awareness raising and media attention to these issues, etc...

In terms of the conceptual framework of this study the above recommendations would support the development of a more complete 'PCD system' which includes the three different types of PCD mechanism identified: (i) policy statement (with a clearer PCD mandate for the CICID); (ii) institutional arrangements (with the strengthening of the co-secretariat that supports the CICID), and (iii) knowledge sharing and assessment mechanisms (with the greater involvement of non-state actors, the HCCI etc).

## **7.2 Main issues, trends and challenges for evaluation synthesis report**

The French institutional and administrative system is characterized by a strong degree of centralism which means that the Presidential backing for PCD initiatives and a politically strong Minister dealing with development cooperation are key factors to ensure that PCD issues will be given the necessary attention. In that respect the process leading to the next Presidential and legislative elections in 2007 could already give an indication as to how PCD issues will be given attention under the next President.

There seems to be a particular way in France to approach the PCD debate. Indeed the notion of "shared interest" where both types of policies find some win-win situations and where the arbitration is not systematically made in favour of development seems more politically realistic and appeals to French officials and policy-makers as a way to better "sell" development interests. The Global Public Goods debate also seduces French institutional actors dealing with development cooperation. However, the extent to which this debate has gone further than development actors remains unclear.

## **7.3 Additional conclusions on CICID & PCD**

Policy coherence for development is slowly arriving in the French public policy debate. At this stage there is no clear political commitment to ensure PCD in France, but the clear and extensive reference to PCD in the cross-cutting policy document related to development cooperation (Document de Politique transversale-DPT ) illustrates that this is changing. Different factors have increased the awareness of institutional and NSAs on the issue. The internal debate on PCD and especially the fact that PCD has received so much attention lately within the European fora have been key elements to provide some visibility to this issue. Additional ad hoc elements have also widened the debate to a broader public, such as the publication of the Centre for Global Development Index. More could be done, however,

particularly at the level of the French Parliament and civil society who should take a stronger interest in pushing strategic reforms in the development cooperation and PCD arenas.

In the French institutional context, CICID has emerged from the first institutional reform of the development cooperation architecture as an inter-departmental coordination body that groups 12 Ministries related to development cooperation and is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its aim is to provide strategic guidance to the French development cooperation policy. Its mandate does not include specific reference to PCD and it is clearly perceived by all actors as a coordination body ensuring strategic guidance and an improved dialogue among the three main development institutional actors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economics, Industry and Finance and French Agency for Development). Since CICID only meets once a year, its impact is limited to strategic decisions and its more day to day work is carried out by a Secretariat co-chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance with the presence of the French Agency for Development which has certainly contributed to smoothening the dialogue among these three actors. Yet at the same time CICID's last decision on migration in June 2006, has led some to think that it could be addressing other PCD issues in a more structured manner.

CICID is only one mechanism in a complex institutional system (see description above) that has in one way or another addressed PCD issues. It should be complemented by more informal PCD mechanisms such as informal networks on migration and development and trade and development, etc. These types of informal networks allowed the MFA to exchange on PCD issues with a broad variety of civil society organizations, advisory councils and independent experts. Such informal networks have an essential role to play in sensitizing a larger group of actors on these policy mix issues. The reform of the institutional system with the introduction of LOLF and an interdepartmental mission to prepare the annual budget has also enabled a more comprehensive view of ODA spending and French development cooperation actions.

In addition to the three key summary recommendations mentioned in paragraph 7.1 above various more detailed recommendations also emerged from the interviews:

Related to the first recommendation:

- To invite CICID to clearly address PCD issues in its deliberations

Related to the second recommendation:

- To reorganize and strengthen inter-ministerial structures that would deal with PCD: for instance the co-secretariat of CICID could do the day to day follow-up of the PCD by organizing practical analysis and sensitisation on PCD, particularly in the ministries that are not directly dealing with development. They would need to be more associated to the work of the co-secretariat and a focal point would need to be designated. CICID could also meet at the level of directors of cabinets several times per year in order to transform it into a more functional mechanism.
- To translate the commitment to ensure PCD through the existing tools of French bilateral cooperation, i.e. the country strategy papers (documents stratégies pays) and the sectoral strategies

Related to the third recommendation:

- To set up some monitoring and evaluation instruments related to PCD: annual reporting (or integration of a specific analysis on PCD in the annual report on the performance of French development cooperation), means to carry out assessments, case studies, evaluations, etc.
- To use the HCCI as a link towards other types of Non-State Actors (civil society originations, Parliamentarians) : it could provide some advice and proposals to CICID on that topic.

## Annex 1: List of principal official source documents

- Décret n. 98-66 du 4 février 1998 portant création du comité interministériel de la coopération internationale pour le développement
- CICID decisions ([www.diplomatie.gouv.fr](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr))
- OECD/DAC Peer Review of France, 2004
- Official Declarations on Foreign Policy (2005)  
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20050519.html#Chapitre2>
- Projet de Loi de finances pour 2006: Document de Politique transversale – Politique française en faveur du développement
- Projet de Loi de finances pour 2007: Document de Politique transversale – Politique française en faveur du développement

## Annex 2: Abbreviations used in the report

3Cs	Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence
AidCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CICID	Comité Interministeriel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement – Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development
COSP	Conference d'Orientation Stratégique et de Programmation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DG Relex	Directorate General for External Relations
DPT	Document de Politique Transversale
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EU-HES	European Union Heads of Evaluation Services
EQ	Evaluation Question
FAD	French Agency for Development
HCCI	Haut Conseil à la Coopération Internationale
HoD	Head of Departement
JC	Judgement Criteria
LOLF	Loi d'Orientation pour la legislation financière
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEFI	Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-State Actor
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development

SGAE	Secrétariat Général aux Affaires européennes
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
ToR	Terms of References

### Annex 3: Persons met

Name	Position
Chataigner, Jean-Marc Fandre, Claude	French Agency for Development, Director of Strategy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of unit dealing with evaluations
Fernandez, Ramon	Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Deputy Director for international financial affairs and development
Foin, Stephane	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of unit dealing strategic orientation for aid
Gabas, Jean-Jacques	Academic
Kamelgarn, Daniel	Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Head of unit dealing with evaluations
Le Chevallier, Aurelien	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of unit, European issues
Mabilais, Regis	Coordination Sud, expert dealing with European issues
Pacquement, François	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Advisor to the Director General for cooperation and international development
Pasquier, Jerome	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Director General of the General Directorate of cooperation and international development
Perrin, Vincent	Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Head of unit development cooperation and multilateral institutions
Pontvianne, Aymerick	Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Head of unit dealing with agriculture negotiations
Rouille d'Orfeuil, Henri	Coordination Sud, President
Ruleta, Michael	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evaluation unit
Saint Sulpice Odin, Pascale	Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry, Development cooperation and multilateral institutions unit
Walter, Jerome	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Member of Cabinet of the Deputy Minister for Cooperation

## Annex 4: Country profile

### 1. List of Policy Statements and Principal Sources (Government documents):

1. French Foreign Ministry website  
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/>
2. 2005 Cross-cutting document on the French Policy for Development presented to the Parliament with the 2006 financial bill  
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/DPTapd-2.pdf>

### 2. To what extent is coherence an explicit objective of MS?

France has not explicitly declared policy coherence for development to be a government objective but has explicitly mentioned it in its **2005 cross-cutting policy document on the French Policy for Development** and has inserted it in its analysis, which is an important step forward. So far, the driving force behind achieving policy coherence for development came primarily from presidential initiatives.

OECD DAC recommended France to draw up a policy document setting out strategic directions for the entire co-operation system<sup>1</sup>. A first yearly **cross-cutting policy document has been prepared in 2005** to accompany the 2006 budgetary discussions. This is an important step forward towards presenting a more unified vision of French development policy, which has not been the case so far partly as a consequence of its institutional setting (see below).

There are several official key principles that guide French development policy such as giving priority to Africa, focusing on global public goods and the regulation of globalization, focusing on sustainable development, focusing on democratic governance, supporting cultural diversity and 'La Francophonie'.

### 3. Indication of when PCD became an issue:

PCD explicitly became an issue in 2005 when it was mentioned for the first time in the 2005 cross-cutting policy document on the French Policy for Development.

### 4. Who is responsible for ensuring the completion of these objectives?

The French institutional architecture dealing with development matters is composed by:

**The Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, MAE), the **Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry** (Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, MINEFI) and the **French Agency for Development** (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) are all responsible for development policy.

The **MINEFI** is responsible for macroeconomic and financial aid. An internal reform has been implemented very recently to enhance coherence of its action regarding developing countries as international affairs and development cooperation services and multilateral trade services are now in the same directorate general.

In 1998, the creation of the **DGCID** (Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement or Directorate General for Development and International Co-operation) as one direction of the MAE had the aim to enhance coherence and effectiveness of France's development action by overcoming the separation of geographical division of development cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is "chef de file" on cooperation issues.

In addition, the **French Agency for Development** (AFD) is active in foreign aid. The AFD's supervisory board includes representatives of the MINEFI, the MAE, the State Secretariat of Overseas Territories, parliamentarians, persons appointed for their expertise and AFD staff. Nonetheless the agency does not seem to have a specific role related to coherence.

<sup>1</sup>OECD DAC's 2004 peer review of development cooperation, pp. 10-12 and 52

## 5. Characterization of institutional architecture for PCD

*(Summarises key points for PCD from the Scoping Study's country research tables)*

Since 1998 France has, through a process of reforming its institutional framework for development cooperation, established some mechanisms that could be used for policy coherence for development if mandated to do so. Interestingly, France seems to have strongly increased its focus on internal (type 1) coherence between the different actors managing French ODA, especially through the creation of a number of different mechanisms. The focus on policy coherence for development has significantly increased in 2005 while being mentioned in a cross-cutting document of French Policy for development.

The major formal mechanisms for promoting dialogue and co-ordination between the different actors involved is the Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID), which is an inter-departmental Working Group that is chaired by the Prime Minister and its members are all Ministers participating in international cooperation and a representative of the Presidency. The MAE and MINEFI hold a joint Secretariat. One of its missions is to ensure coherence among the geographical and sectoral priorities of the different cooperation instruments<sup>2</sup>. The CICID has recently created (i) a strategic orientation and programming conference (Conférence d'orientation stratégique et de programmation – COSP), which aim is to coordinate the action of the different ministries in terms of development cooperation, (ii) an interministerial mission called "Official Development Assistance", which groups the programmes financed by MAE and MINEFI and prepares a cross-cutting policy document "French policy for development" to be presented to the Parliament with the annual financial bill in order to give an overall and coherent view of French ODA and (iii) sectoral strategies and partnership framework documents with partnership countries. The creation of an interministerial mission for ODA provides a unique opportunity to consolidate the goals of French cooperation and planning process through budgetary reorganization and the drafting of a cross cutting document.

Moreover, the General Secretariat for European affairs - Secretariat General des affaires européennes (SGAE) falls under the Prime Minister's authority. It is responsible for coordinating the French position on European issues and the OECD. It is thus the guardian of coherence and unity in the positions France expresses within the EU and the OECD. It is important to notice that its aim is to promote an overall coherent position and that development issues are not more taken into consideration than other issues.

Finally some informal networks have been created about a year ago to work on themes such as trade and development and migration and development following an initiative of the Ministry for foreign affairs. Officials from different ministries are part of these networks and some experts attend when necessary. These networks allow for an informal dialogue to take place on these issues.

## 6. Coverage of the three principal types of PCD mechanisms / Characterisation

	Particular Characteristics <sup>3</sup>	Actors involved: <sup>4</sup>
<b>6.1 Explicit Policy Statements</b> - 2005 Cross-cutting document on the French Policy for Development	Group 2	PM, Par
<b>6.2 Administrative/Institutional</b> A - Inter-Ministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development	Group 4	PM
B - Inter-Ministerial Committee for European Economic Cooperation	Group 4	PM

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum de la France présentée à l'occasion de la revue par les Pairs, pp 31-32

<sup>3</sup> Please refer to page 17 of the inception report, where four groups of PCD mechanisms are distinguished based on four characteristics: political competence, technical competences, PCD only or PCD&other.

<sup>4</sup> Please use abbreviations: CS = civil society; Par = Parliament; Cab = Cabinet; NGOs; PS = Private Sector; PM = Government Policy Makers; Acad = Academics; others

C – Interministerial mission “Official Development Assistance” * PCD is not mentioned explicitly in any of these mechanisms	Group 4	PM
<b>6.3 Knowledge Input and Assessment</b> - None identified		

#### 7. External Opinions:

**The 2004 OECD DAC Peer Review** recommends France to:

1: Make policy coherence for development an explicit goal of the French government and specify the institutional arrangements to be used – in particular co-ordination mechanisms and arbitration procedures.

2: To ensure that the interests of developing countries are taken into account more systematically in the policies pursued by France, initiate a more rigorous debate by identifying the practical objectives to be achieved at ministerial level and within the administration (OECD/DAC 2003: 14).

#### 8. Contacts

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