



**Evaluation Study
on
The EU Institutions & Member States'
Mechanisms for Promoting
Policy Coherence for Development**

**Appendix IX
Case Study Report
The role of the Development Committee of the
European Parliament in the promotion of PCD in
the European Union**

**Client: The Evaluation Services of
- French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lead agency
- Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and the European Commission**

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1 Introduction

The Heads of Evaluation for External Cooperation of the EU Member States and the European Commission have initiated a series of six evaluation studies focussing on how the Maastricht Treaty precepts of, *coordination, complementarity and coherence* (the '3Cs') have been translated into practice, and with what impact. The current study, one of the six in the series, focuses on '**EU Mechanisms Promoting Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)**'. As part of this evaluation seven different mechanisms that promote coherence have been examined in different parts of the EU to see how they carry out this task and to what effect. This report thus covers the role of one such mechanism in promoting PCD.

This evaluation of PCD mechanisms is being carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI), and PARTICIP GmbH. The evaluation analyses and assesses mechanisms for promoting intra-governmental coherence that have been introduced in the administrations of the Member States and the European institutions since the late 1990s, with the purpose of:

Objectives of this evaluation:

- a) Judging their relevance and effectiveness, as well as the mechanisms' efficiency, impact and sustainability, in terms of promoting PCD and within their specific contexts;
- b) Formulating proposals to improve the relevance and effectiveness in terms of promoting PCD of the mechanisms analysed, without neglecting their efficiency, impact and sustainability requirements in this role;
- c) Enabling politicians and officials in Member States and in European institutions to learn lessons from experience about effective PCD mechanisms and use these more widely.

The evaluation has been commissioned and is managed by the Evaluation Service of France, with the support of a Steering Group that also includes representatives from the evaluation services of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the European Commission.

A 'PCD mechanism', as the term is used in this Study, is taken to mean a mechanism that is a clearly identifiable object of study with concrete features, such as a name and some terms of reference that include PCD as a purpose even as part of a wider scope. Clarity on who is involved, and defined operating ways, are the other elements that qualify the mechanisms. All the mechanisms have other roles as well, but this study only examines their PCD role and does not pretend to cover any other broader role they may have.

The case studies are intended to give the researchers a livelier grasp of the reality of these mechanisms especially by helping them to understand how they are perceived by stakeholders, and by seeing how they operate in their specific governance system.

The process for selecting the case studies is described in Section 4 of the Desk Study. In choosing the cases a systematic effort was made to choose a selection of different types of mechanisms so as to be able to see at close range how different approaches work and the advantages and disadvantages each one might have. The selection thus includes for example one parliamentary committee, a sector-wide development programme, an external advisory committee, a 'whole of government' approach using a government bill, two different systems of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental committees and an inter-department policy consultation system. Cases are also taken from regions of the EU, from EU institutions and from both larger and smaller member states. Finally there are cases from each of the three different functional types of PCD mechanism identified by the Study in the Inception Phase: (i) Policy Statements, (ii) Institutional or Administrative mechanisms, and (iii) Knowledge Input and Assessment mechanisms

The prime reason for selecting this particular mechanism for a case study is that the profile of the Development Committee of the European parliament (DEVE) corresponds closely to one of the three functional types of PCD mechanisms identified in the Inception note, namely the Institutional or Administrative mechanism. DEVE is also a parliamentary committee, and out of the variety of mechanisms of the type (ii) it was interesting to include at least one parliamentary mechanism. Moreover, recent studies¹ have studied the role of the EU Council and European Commission vis-à-vis coherence, so looking at the case of the European Parliament was seen as a timely learning opportunity.

2 Data collection methods

Two team meetings were organised to prepare the field surveys. During the first meeting, the various tools that could be used were analysed and discussed. Two checklists were produced. A detailed list, covering all EQs and judgement criteria which also sought to identify key issues and tools was prepared as well as a shorter one, aimed at ensuring that all key issues would be discussed during the interviews. The list of types of actors to be interviewed was categorised in different families and integrated in a standard methodology for preparing and implementing the case studies. A template for the case study report was also drafted so as to ensure homogeneity of reporting.

After the field survey tools had been completed a first field mission was conducted to ensure the tools worked well and some improvements were made. Thereafter a second full team meeting was convened to brief all the field survey teams on how to use the tools and ensure homogeneity in their use. Instructions for interviews were also given, and a discussion was had on how to prioritise information within the short space of time budgeted for each case study.

To prepare the visits each case study team sent an information note to the principle contact Ministry which was then forwarded to the various other Ministries presenting the aims and the content of the case study work. Potential interviewees were discussed between the field study team and the contact Ministry and then a final programme was drawn up.

The evaluation used semi-structured interviews based on the evaluation questions as the main information collection tool, and review of background documents on in-country coherence as well as documents related to the specific PCD mechanism. The short period of time allotted to the mission did not allow much time for many consultations with a wide range of stakeholders outside the specific Ministry responsible for managing the PCD mechanism (e.g. parliament, various civil society actors, etc.) but every effort was made to ensure that a representative sample was covered in each case. The two days budgeted for interviews in each country, was in some cases increased a bit where possible to cater for individual circumstances.

Given the limited time available for field work this report represents a snapshot of the background, current practices and future challenges relating specifically to how the mechanism selected performs its role of promoting PCD. It focuses on providing an accurate overview and highlighting main prospective issues relating to this PCD role rather than on detailed information on all actions carried out. In particular readers should note that *no attempt is made to look at any broader role the mechanism might have in addition to that of promoting PCD, except if such a broader role might positively or negatively affect the PCD role.*

¹ CEPS (2006).

One potential bias of the case studies is the high proportion of interviewed staff working in the Ministry responsible for development, compared to the staff of other Ministries. The overall perception may therefore reflect the position of this ministry more than others.

The team of consultants would like to thank the DEVE Secretariat for their assistance in organising the study and the persons met for their flexibility and their willingness to help.

3 Country profiles

During the evaluation's desk study phase, individual 'country profiles' have been prepared for each of the EU Member States and Institutions. This profile describes in a systematic manner the main elements of that Member State or Institution's approach towards promoting policy coherence for development. The profiles include information on the most important policy statements, institutional architecture, the internal division of responsibilities and the identified mechanisms to promote PCD.

The analysis in these profiles, which was based on official public documents, was subsequently verified and where possible enriched through a targeted consultation with key officials in EU Member States. As is mentioned on page 11 of the evaluation's Terms of References, the profiles concern the main objective of the desk study for this evaluation and provide a '(...) deeper insight of the existing PCD mechanisms, by building on the scoping study. An elaboration of the analytical and comprehensive overview will allow for a better international comprehension and comparison. This phase will also lead to the final selection of the mechanisms for the case studies.'

The country profile for the case study covered in this report can be found in Annex 4.

4 Description of mechanism

Powers and responsibilities: introduction²

Like all Parliaments, the European Parliament has three fundamental powers: legislative, budgetary and supervisory power. The standing committees, as specialised bodies, examine matters under their remit and submit their position, in the form of rapports containing draft resolutions, for final adoption by plenary. Only when a resolution is finally adopted by plenary does it become the official position of the European Parliament.

Development policy is the only area of foreign policy which is adopted under the co-decision procedure by Parliament, the Commission and the Council. The Standing Committee on Development (referred to as: DEVE) is therefore important since it plays a direct role for devising community policies, and is in an interesting position to promote PCD at this level.

The legal basis for Policy Coherence for Development is the Maastricht Treaty (on the European Union – 1992)³. The Development Policy Statement (2000) reiterates the objectives of Article 177 and 178 EC4 and highlights the need for improved coherence

² A more complete description of the Committee, including its composition and roles, is annexed (see Annex 5).

³ The development objectives of the European treaties are stated in Article 177 of the TEC: (i) Sustainable economic and social development of developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; (ii) the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and (iii) the campaign against poverty in the developing countries, while Article 178 of TEC states: The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.

among the EC/EU policies. In theory, the legal texts and the policy statement refer to all internal and external policies of the European Union. The European Consensus includes four articles (35-38) which are specifically about coherence. Article 35 connects the need for policy coherence for development to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.⁵ A specific framework for PCD had been proposed by the Commission (April 2005) and endorsed in Council conclusions (May 2005) where commitments are made in 12 areas. An important step in this direction has already been the elaboration of a rolling work programme on PCD (2006-2007).

The Committee on Development deals with the European Union's relationship with the developing world, which figures prominently on Europe's political, diplomatic and trade agenda. It is the Parliament's main actor in the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the Union.

'The Committee is responsible for⁶:

1. the promotion, implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the Union, notably:
 - (a) political dialogue with developing countries, bilaterally and in the relevant international organisations and inter parliamentary fora,
 - (b) aid to, and cooperation agreements with, developing countries,
 - (c) promotion of democratic values, good governance and human rights in developing countries;
2. matters relating to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement and relations with the relevant bodies;
3. Parliament's involvement in election observation missions, when appropriate in cooperation with other relevant committees and delegations.

The committee coordinates the work of the inter-parliamentary delegations and ad hoc delegations falling within its remit.'

In addition, the Committee plays a pivotal role in developing and strengthening relations between the EU and its African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners by closely following the implementation of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement) and through its participation on the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

The Committee does have *de facto* a specific mandate to promote PCD and acts accordingly to defend development policy, as the reports issued by DEVE indicate, together with the position the Committee defends in the plenary sessions and throughout the scope of its activities. An analysis of the reports issued by the Committee in the past 10 years illustrate that this is even a growing tendency.

⁵ 'It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims.'

⁶ Powers and responsibility of DEVE as set in Annex VI of the rules of procedures of EP, adopted by decision of Parliament of 29 January 2004.

Term	All reports			Reports on PCD			
	Total number of reports and recommendations	Own initiative		Reports dealing with PCD		Own initiative on PCD	
		Number	% of all reports	Number	% of all reports	Number	% of PCD reports
4th Term: 1996-1999	47	8	17%	13	28%	3	23%
				Themes: 2 x GSP, 1 x agriculture, 3x banana, 3x environment, 1x drug, 1x private sector, 1x complementarity, 1x effectiveness)		Themes: 1 x trade, 1x banana, 1 x GSP	
5th Term: 1999-2004	64	24	38%	17	27%	8	47%
				Themes: 1x trade, 1x complementarity, 2 x GSP, 1x ICT, 2x effectiveness, 1x fishery, 5x environment, 1x energy, 1x EPA, 1x banana, 1x forestry		Themes: 1x trade, 1x ICT, 2x effectiveness, 1x energy, 1x EPA, 1x banana, 1x forestry	
6th Term: 2004-2008	26	19	73%	11	42%	8	73%
	(until September 2006 but still ongoing)			Themes: 2x aid effectiveness, 1x migration, 1x fair trade, 1x'European Consensus', 1xEPAs, 2x dev & economic cooperation, 1x trade & agriculture (sugar), 1x tourism, 1x media		Themes: 2x aid effectiveness, 1x migration, 1x fair trade, 1x'European Consensus', 1xEPAs, 1x tourism, 1x media	

The on going term shows an important increase in the number of reports dealing with PCD matters (so far over 40% of the reports, compared to less than 30% in the past two terms). It also shows how the Committee became increasingly proactive to promote PCD by using own initiative reports to foster the debate on PCD matters (more than 40% of DEVE own initiative reports address PCD related concerns so far in the sixth term of legislation compared to respective 12.5 and 6 per cent in the previous two terms).

The political institutionalisation of the importance of promoting PCD (European Consensus, Council conclusions) and the regular interface of DEVE with other committees on a regular basis are also important reasons for DEVE Members and Secretariat to engage in promoting PCD. A quote from Mrs Luisa Morgantini, DEVE Committee Chair⁷ illustrates this view: *'We have worked in cooperation with other committees because there are no watertight compartments in our parliamentary activities: development is an overarching policy, and our work is linked to that of the Committees on Foreign Affairs, International Trade, Agriculture, Justice, Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities, and of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, delegations for relations with third countries and other bodies'*⁸

⁷ At the time of the elaboration of the report

⁸ in the preamble of the infokit on the European Parliament Committee for Development

5 Main findings on evaluation questions

5.1 Evaluation question 1

To what extent and why did the process of establishing the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms respond to specific constraints and produce mechanisms that are particularly suited to these parameters?

5.1.1 Effect European debate on coherence had on establishment of PCD mechanisms

The fact that the European debate has had an effect on DEVE's work on PCD holds particularly true in comparison with Member States' mechanisms since it is part of the European Parliament, primarily in charge of monitoring the Union's debate and policy. In the EU complex institutional setting, the Commission and the Council have a prior role in deciding on and implementing PCD. However all interviewees referred to specific policy discussions that they consider have fostered the theme of PCD in the parliamentary debate and enhanced DEVE's attention on this specific issue. For example, The common signature – for the first time of all three institutions (European Commission, European Council and European Parliament) of a document setting out common objectives and principles for development cooperation, the European Consensus on Development⁹ was an important step because it devotes considerable attention to policy coherence for development and takes a series of strong commitments in this respect.

From the most recent debate, various people interviewed refer to the monitoring of the EU PCD commitments as another major step for DEVE to engage on PCD. The Secretariat emphasised that DEVE will have to coordinate the views of the EP for the preparation of the first biennial report that should take into account feedback from a variety of actors including the European Parliament.

The most frequent reference remains the debate over the instruments in the field of external relations, with the firm position of DEVE to defend the split between economic cooperation and development cooperation that eventually led to the adoption of the DCI regulation. DEVE strongly opposed the propose instrument that would have governed cooperation with industrialised and developing countries. This institutional battle was seen as an 'eye opener' for DEVE members in the sense that is illustrated their responsibility to safeguard development objectives in the policy arena and EC external relations architecture. Now that the debate on the instruments is over and the regulation concluded, the all issue of monitoring their implementation of the country strategies is at the heart of the Committee's tasks.

5.1.2 Evidence that international thinking on PCD have influenced mechanisms

The Millennium Development Goals have clearly influenced the debate in the EP. In 2005, the European Parliament adopted the report of the Committee on *Development on the Millennium Development Goals*. Introduced by DEVE, the text emphasised that poverty reduction through the achievement of the MDGs and the Millennium Declaration must be recognised unambiguously as the overarching framework for EU development policy and that this must be reflected clearly in all relevant policy and legislative proposals. But MEPs stressed that the MDGs should not be seen purely as a technical matter to be resolved simply by providing more money without identifying and tackling the underlying causes of

⁹ on 20 December 2005

poverty. It was said that the Goals were used to introduce to underline the issue of PCD in other discussions like the one on the aid effectiveness package¹⁰. The MDGs are often quoted and provide an opportunity for DEVE to underline the importance of delivering better and faster aid, but also in direct relation to PCD, the need to develop a global partnership for development and face other challenges like environmental sustainability that are related to internal policies options the EU and Member States are making.

What was also reflected during the interviews is the fact that development policy is increasingly reflecting the interdependence between internal and external policy, driven by globalization and emergence of global threats and challenges. Development is no longer seen in isolation or opposition to other policies and DEVE in particular is in a position to facilitate public debate to foster a positive approach in this context.

5.1.3 Major 'agents of change' advocated for the mechanisms, contributed to its establishment and participate in the further promotion and activities

The Secretariat and MEP, generally suggested that the position of Committee Chair is important because it offers a number of prerogatives that can make PCD a priority item for the Committee. The chair presides over the meetings and draws up the agendas of the committee so he can insist on the need for systematic scrutiny of the reports to identify where PCD is needed. He speaks for it in the plenary sessions when appropriate, and acts as the committee representative to outside bodies. The importance he gives to the issue of PCD and the capacity he has to mobilize interest even outside the scope of DEVE is fundamental for PCD to be seriously addressed in the EP.

Besides the Chair, the personal interest of MEPs in the committee for PCD was said to be a key element for the capacity of DEVE to promote it. Their capacity to engage with the NGO community to collect data and evidence on cases of incoherence for instance opens the possibilities to echo cases at the institutional level. In practise, there is general acknowledgment that it mostly depends on the Members' own interest (for a specific theme for example, or according to their national political debate). The list of reports shows that Members have used a lot the possibility of drafting 'own initiative' reports. Some members expressed the fact that it also takes quite some devotion to follow up on promoting PCD since it is not necessarily recognised by their direct electorate as a priority. According to their capacity to do so, including by using their substitute seat in other committees and positions within their political group to advocate for PCD, Members can become promoters of PCD. The Secretariat agreed on these Members' points of view.

Another fundamental element that has been frequently expressed is about the capacity of the DEVE Secretariat in providing background notes, assisting the members in drafting reports and managing the legislative work. The best way to advocate for PCD is to be able to advocate for development objectives in other policies, so the Secretariat capacity to monitor all related pieces of legislation that could affect (positively or negatively) development objectives is important, as the capacity to mobilise members and provide them with the sufficient technical elements to plead for PCD.

As all decisions are eventually agreed upon at the plenary level, promoting PCD ultimately falls under the rules of the political process and the connections between the Committee and the parliamentary majority. Some interviewees explained that this passage through this rather complex web of influence can be piloted via various routes including the Committee Chair; some specific members and the coalition they can develop in their own groups; the political group of the President of the parliament and the connection with the Conference of Presidents in allowing or not enhanced cooperation to DEVE for instance; etc.

¹⁰ Texts adopted by the Commission on 2 March 2006. The Development Committee adopted a report on the three communications.

5.1.4 Major national or international examples of policy (in)coherence for development which prompted the establishment of the mechanisms

Several examples of incoherence between the trade policy and the development objectives were quoted as examples to have prompted DEVE to take position in favour of PCD (frozen chicken; banana; General System of Preference; anti-dumping case, EPAs negotiation). Some contacts suggested that the inclination of the Committee and Members to take up the debate is also linked to what the media features, and what pressure is felt at the level of the national government. Media attention given to a specific event justifies the attention a MEP can give to the issue in the eyes of his or her electorate. A recent example is the impact of the dramatic flows of human arriving in poor conditions in the Canary Island which pushed upfront the issue of migration and development. On going research on the links between fishery and immigration to understand the causes that push West Africans to embark on fragile boats to cross the ocean towards Europe was quoted as an example of a political group success in mobilising DEVE members on PCD issues rooted in current affairs.

There is an overall recognition amongst all interviewees of the impact of the NGO community in advertising incoherence examples by collecting data and publishing case studies. This represents an important source of information that DEVE can benefit from to echo the situation and foster public debate. NGO networks have their own connections to a number of MEPs in DEVE and some understanding of what type of ideas some of them would be eager to push forward (for instance on trade issues) and adjust their advocacy accordingly.

5.1.5 Dissatisfaction with impact and effectiveness that existing coherence mechanisms have on PCD (limited effects...)

Some concerns were expressed during the interviews that the issue of coherence remain rather conceptual in the Committee, and more generally in the EP and EU level. The limited ownership of the 'coherence' issue is illustrated by the lack of actual procedures to promote PCD at EU level. The recent commitment of the EU towards PCD and the work plan resulting from the adoption of Council conclusions draws a new line of action with concrete tools like the biennial report on EU PCD and will most probably mainstream interest about the issue, but some suggested that so far the role of the EP and the DEVE Committee remained unclear and that the conclusions do not help clarify the responsibility of the Parliament (and by extension DEVE) in promoting PCD.

Both EC and Council interviewees suggested that there is now a common agenda at the European level to promote coherence but limited translation of all these obligations at their level: being to internalise them in making policies or when implementing policies and that the role of Parliament is not obvious. Moreover, the overall impression is that the impact of coherence is best valued at the field level where it is difficult for Parliament in general and DEVE in particular to monitor the implementation of cooperation.

However, some noted that the lack of coherence also occurs when different concepts of what development means meet. Some members underlined the fact that the EP is a dialogue forum where such differences are particularly exposed. There is a sense amongst interviewees that MEPs are sometimes confronted with the fact that their government takes positions which are against PCD. A few examples of some governmental moves were given that jeopardized a common effort at the field level (on managing conflict in Africa to name one example). Consequences of such situations are shared in the Committee and enhance reflection on the responsibility of promoting PCD at the European level.

5.1.6 Uniqueness of particular PCD mechanisms to the particular European context

Different standing committees deal with external relations in the European Parliament besides the Committee on Development (DEVE): the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and indirectly the Committee on Budget. None of these committees have a specific PCD mandate listed under their powers and responsibilities, but the DEVE Committee is following this issue, and 'coherence' is often mentioned in reports addressing development issues in relation to other policies (migration, agriculture, trade, etc. See table on page 5). There is also a widespread opinion that DEVE is a parliamentary committee that can bring the debate to the public on the PCD issue, and is responsible for monitoring accountability on the commitments taken in this regard.

In discussing the relative weakness of development policy in the overall European policy debate (in comparison to internal EU policies) it was mentioned the fact that DEVE is still a fully fledged committee despite the fact that the Development Council has been absorbed in the GAERC Council. The suggestion that the fact that DEVE was kept and reinforced (with a few more staff in the past years joining in the Secretariat) attests to the Committee's added value, was generally accepted. Another element was also put forward: DEVE benefits from a unique position in the set of Committees that deal with external actions, to defend development objectives within the EP and the EU setting at political level because it is the only one that has the power of co-decision over development related legislation.

Most interviewees agreed that a specificity of Members of the Committee is that they are exposed to field realities through regular fact-finding missions, and election supervision and that it gives them a more practical understanding of the 'enjeux' at stake with PCD. This point was reinforced with the argument that the members of the JPA – mostly from DEVE even though not exclusively - are in direct and regular contact with their African, Caribbean and Pacific homologues. They also benefit from the opportunity to visit projects in partner countries where the JPA takes place. The impact of the work of the Assembly embraces the fundamental objectives of development policy and gives the opportunity to DEVE to be directly confronted with the field reality and regular dialogue with their Southern counterparts.

5.1.7 Success in surmounting specific obstacles for setting up PCD mechanisms

DEVE has illustrated its capacity to make the best use of the internal procedures to defend its development views. For instance while the Committee wanted to inform the debate on the EP's Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) it knew that they would never be authorized by the conference of presidents to elaborate a report on the issue since it was clearly a trade competences, falling under the responsibility of the INTA Committee (international trade). The committee turned the issue around, elaborating a report on the 'development impact of EPAs'.

However, there is a general recognition amongst members and the Secretariat that sometimes the procedures play against them. The biggest challenge to promote PCD for DEVE is to identify in all the communications and texts that the EP receives which are not dealing with development policy, the items where development objectives might be threatened or better promoted when in fact it is precisely because they are not on development that DEVE will not receive them¹¹. It is generally acknowledged amongst interviewees, that since the systematic PCD scrutiny system is not in place, it happens that some positions are taken in plenary without the possibility for DEVE to react on time. The example of fishery agreements was quoted several times where a fast track procedure is used in plenary to vote on the agreement whereas there is not enough time and capacity for DEVE to react¹².

¹¹ The conference of presidents and central secretariat dispatch the documents according to the competences of the Committees.

¹² An international agreement gives little room of manoeuvre since the EP can only accept or reject it (without the

Overall finding for EQ 1 - summary box

DEVE is set up for other purposes than promoting PCD which is not formally in its mandate (though given that PCD is an objective of the TEU, the Committee can be argued to have a responsibility to consider the issue) but the work of the Committee shows a growing interest for the issue. In these terms, MEPs have taken some concrete steps to push PCD forward and are supported by the Committee Secretariat. Even though the European Commission and Council have more direct responsibilities in promoting PCD in practice, DEVE picked up on opportunities in the recent European policy debate to advocate for the safeguard and promotion of development objectives. It also raises awareness in the European parliament and public on the importance of PCD by highlighting the issue in a growing number of reports and by echoing cases of incoherence.

5.2 Evaluation question 2

How and why are the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms relevant in promoting intra-governmental PCD in their particular context?

5.2.1 Mechanisms are in line with the European policy objectives (policy relevance)

The objective of coherence for development is featured in all fundamental institutional and legal texts of the EU. PCD is not a new concept and already has a legal basis since 1992 in the Treaty of the European Union (Art. 178). *'In implementing its policies that may affect developing countries, the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation'*. The draft constitutional treaty would have strengthened this commitment (art. III – 292, about the consistency of foreign policy objectives and art. III – 316, on development cooperation and policy coherence) even further.

All related policy framework from the European Consensus on Development to the newly voted instrument on development cooperation mentions PCD, and feedback from the European Parliament is expected for the elaboration of the first EU biennial report on PCD.

The 2002 DAC Peer Review makes 3 recommendations on PCD in the EU institutions but none concerns the EP. However for each of them, the DEVE Committee could be an active player:

- on reviewing the coherence of the Community policies with development objectives, as a growing number of report issued illustrates;
- on feedback on CSPs, as a new possibility offered by the DCI framework;
- on initiatives towards Member States with a sensitisation of national parliaments on PCD.

During a recent hearing organised on the initiative of the DEVE Chair¹³, Mrs Morgantini, to discuss of development issues with national parliaments, the issue of PCD came back many times. (Eg. It was introduced by the keynote speakers Presidency – Finnish President of Parliament & Commissioner Michel; and was the subject of many of the questions introduced by national MPs).

possibility to amend it) so the point made by some interviewees was more the fact that DEVE is missing the possibility to send out a clear political message to the whole assembly by reacting on such texts, and sometimes simply because the type of procedure used did not allow for the Committee to prepare its own position.

¹³ At the time of the elaboration of the draft report on EPAs by INTA.

5.2.2 Mechanisms are integrated in the European policy, implementation and practices (institutional relevance)

In the EU setting, several mechanisms exist at the levels of policy, implementation and practice to promote PCD. Since the Commission is responsible for the implementation of development cooperation policy (and every other policy), it is better equipped to deal with PCD in practice. However, the European Parliament also defends PCD at policy level, and echoes the debate on PCD to the European public. Each Committee defends its own policy area, and the need for coherence according to its specific policy objectives. In addition, DEVE, benefits from a certain ethical consensus to promote international solidarity and its members are usually quite committed to their 'own' policy, resulting in a Committee which is specifically active in defending the development objectives in its own institution setting, even when it means confronting other policies in a PCD approach, including against internal EU policies that some suggested are more appealing to the Members' electorate.

5.2.3 Key issues from European political context have been integrated in the selection and design of mechanisms (contextual relevance)

PCD is not a central thread in the European Parliament and does not feature specifically in the mandate of DEVE. It is therefore very linked to the will of specific Members and good will within the Secretariat to promote the issue and mobilise skills to build good technical files to defend development objectives when they are being undermined by other policies or that synergy are inadequately generated. However, a majority of interviewees agreed on the fact that the recent struggle over the co-decision procedure concerning the DCI opened the eyes of many and enhanced the sense of responsibility of the Committee and its member to pro-actively promote PCD. There is a feeling that DEVE has made his voice heard and is becoming increasingly stronger in defending its own vision not only at the EP level but within the EU institutional setting.

5.2.4 Mechanisms' design and actions correspond to their official purpose and take into consideration main pre-conditions (internal relevance)

As was made clear in most interviews, with co-decision, DEVE can defend very well its own vision of development since the Council can not adopt a regulation if it is not approved by the EP. On the other hand, there is a common understanding, including in DEVE Secretariat and amongst the Committee Members, that for all other issues that may have an impact on development but do not fall under the co-decision procedure, the capacity of DEVE to influence the outcome are limited since the Council decides on the basis of the EC proposal. Only the assent procedure used for ratifying international treaties involves the authorisation of the Parliament but there is no room of manoeuvre as the EP can only accept or reject, without any possibility to propose amendments. In the case of fishery agreements for instance, this limits the possibility for DEVE to push for development objectives, and so far there is no record of any international treaty being rejected by the EP. PCD matters do not have a sufficient political weight to lead to the rejection of such agreements. In the case of consultation procedures, the EP does not have the power to change the EC proposal but can put forward comments.

It is generally recognised that to lead on a report means a lot to the Committee concerned for ensuring that one's views are being taken into consideration (it is taken to the plenary and voted by all MEPs before it becomes an EP position, but amendments during the plenary debate are said to rarely question the substance and main options of the report). The responsibility to draft the report is assigned to the committee in charge of the policy within the range of its competences – in the case of DEVE, development matters. However, promoting PCD is precisely attempting to have development objectives respected in other policies, in order to foster better cooperation or at least to prevent that other policies influence negatively on development objectives. The paradox lies in the fact that DEVE precisely will not get the

lead on reports which are not purely development oriented. When it interferes with other committees competences DEVE is not always in a position to push for the amendments tabled to be taken into account in the vote by the plenary.

5.2.5 Mechanisms are in line with the internationally recognised demand for PCD

The Committee is well aware of commitments taken at international level (like the MDGs) and has been directly associated with the legal basis for PCD and the policy framework mentioning PCD (ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, co-signature of the European Consensus and co-decision on DCI). The mandate of DEVE does not refer specifically to PCD but it is in charge of ensuring the right use of the budget to implement the policy as tabled in the statement, decision, regulations and treaty that explicitly refer to PCD.

5.2.6 Mechanisms' remits cover main policy sectors relevant for development

Out of the 20 standing committees of the EP, different committees deal with external relations besides the Committee on Development (DEVE): the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and indirectly the Committee on Budget. Other committees are responsible for internal EU policies that can affect development objectives. None of these committees have a specific PCD mandate listed under their powers and responsibilities, but obviously the DEVE Committee is following this issue. There is of course a power game between several committees that are all defending their own competences but the majority of interviewees confirmed that DEVE was keen on ensuring PCD, as quoted by several Members: 'Our Committee will always fight'.

Overall finding for EQ 2 - summary box

The objective of coherence for development has a legal basis in the TEU and is featured in all relevant development policy documents that the European Parliament has either ratified, co-decided or is scrutinizing. However, PCD is not a priority for the European Parliament and the Commission – in charge of implementing of development cooperation - is better equipped to deal with PCD in practice. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the EP setting, DEVE, like any other committee, defends its own 'policy' and acts accordingly when it comes to advocate for development objectives and issues related to this area of competence.

When DEVE does not have the possibility to directly influence policy making with co-decision, other procedures limit the Committee's possibility to achieve PCD impact. It relies therefore considerably on the Members' will to take PCD issues in the political arena through the political process where the weight of development cooperation is less than internal policies and to make the best use of the various instruments at their disposal (own initiative reports, hearings, presence in international parliamentary fora, etc.).

5.3 Evaluation question 3

How effective and efficient are the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms in achieving their objectives within their context? In cases where governments have established several PCD mechanisms were established, to what extent and how do these mutually reinforce each other or do they perhaps work at cross purposes in some respects?

5.3.1 The design and modus operandi of mechanisms facilitates progress towards intra-governmental PCD

A number of possibilities are offered to DEVE to emphasize its objectives. The most commonly mentioned by people interviewed to push for a PCD case was the combination of a strong sense of initiative and a good knowledge of the procedures in order to address the development perspectives in different policies *with* strong arguments to convince the Conference of Presidents to assign leadership in drafting reports and strong technical knowledge on the case (eg: the lead on an own initiative report on EPAs, granted to DEVE instead of INTA¹⁴).

Many referred to the possibility to use a wide variety of instruments (hearings, electoral missions, own initiative reports, questions to the EC) and specific potential (high international exposure; participation in Joint Parliamentary Assembly; regular meetings with Parliamentary Delegations like ASEAN or PAP) that the Committee has and that can be directly use to push PCD. While several interviewees mention the forthcoming challenge of implementation of DCI¹⁵ as a good entrance door to monitor PCD in practise, one person also put forward the possibility to question the EC on the implementation of the EU PCD agenda¹⁶.

5.3.2 There is clarity among most relevant actors about the identity, role, specific focus and modus operandi of the mechanisms

The Annex 4 of the rule of procedures of the European Parliament explicitly defines the powers and responsibilities of each standing committees. Nevertheless some grey areas remain, especially with regards to the competences of INTA and AFET. For instance, the first report that the newly created INTA committee had to work on when the sixth legislature started was about the General System of Preferences. Being a committee dealing with international trade, INTA had quite understandingly a trade oriented approach to the issue. However DEVE, which used to deal with this matter prior to INTA's creation, had a somehow opposite pro-development approach and because they had more experience in working on this subject and mobilising their members, they managed to push quite a few elements in the final position of the EP.

Some also referred to the constant changes of Members being assigned to the Committee and the Secretariat staff regular turn over as a disruptive element in the capacity of DEVE to mobilise capacity on PCD.

Basically, when tabling comments, there is no guarantee that the views expressed will be taken into consideration unless it is a co-decision case.

5.3.3 The mechanisms' activities contribute towards progress on intra-governmental PCD (as per outcomes in logical intervention diagram)

A few cases illustrate the capacity of DEVE to promote PCD. An interesting example is when it strongly opposed the proposed instrument that would have governed cooperation both with industrialised and with developing countries. Members thought that it would result in the merger of two policy areas with quite separate goals and working methods, to the detriment of development cooperation objectives. This view was shared by the NGO community.

¹⁴ In order to convince the Conference of President and make very clear what the intention was DEVE entitled the own initiative report 'the *development impact* of EPAs'.

¹⁵ The research showed clearly that the EP – with its DEVE committee seriously intend to monitor the implementation of the CSP. Some interviewees have confirmed the exchange of letters between institutions to agree on modalities to do so.

¹⁶ Especially on the EC bi-annual work plan.

The Committee also believed that the regulation would undermine Parliament's possibility to promote PCD, since it would give extensive powers of implementation to the Commission and Council, at the expense of the Parliament's legislative and budgetary powers. By limiting the monitoring and decision making of the EP on this instrument, DEVE would have a lesser possibility to push, especially within the wider EU external relations field. In the end the two goals were separated and one instrument has just been approved by Council to deal only with development cooperation (DCI). DEVE is now looking at modalities to ensure the monitoring of the implementation of this instrument to safeguard development policy objectives and PCD commitments.

By facilitating debate on a number of cases¹⁷ to shed light on possible tensions between development objectives and other European policies or by illustrating clear examples of incoherence, DEVE has managed to raise awareness of the MEPs and the wider public and officials from the Commission and the Council about PCD.

5.3.4 Appropriate levels of resources (human and financial capacity) are provided to ensure full and efficient use of the mechanisms

Views expressed in the different EU institutions showed that promoting PCD confronts the DEVE staff with all sorts of policies. It requires expanded knowledge and expertise to make a strong case in order to be taken seriously. Besides, the Secretariat emphasised that PCD can best be enhanced by adapting to the different phase of the DEVE work, requesting different organisations and expertise:

- legislative work with the example of the co-decision on the new instruments, ;
- oversight of the implementation for the monitoring of PCD.

It implies different types of support for the Members (geographic expertise for CSPs, technical expertise for policy related issue like trade or fishery agreement, etc.). At the same time, the Secretariat is under pressure to deliver on many aspects: from the support to Members, to the preparation of the JPA and follow up on the activity the ad hoc PAP delegation. It cumulates overall 7 responsibilities which restrain its capacity to constantly monitor parliamentary activity to spot opportunities to promote PCD. In addition some of DEVE activities involve more travelling than for other committees and therefore less capacity to systematically monitor all issues posted on the agenda and provide timely input.

The Members can also rely on the expertise from the central Secretariat and their own political group expertise (in this case they will be more exposed to political checks and balances), but the views expressed converge to mention that there is inadequate staffing in DEVE to more systematically scrutinize EP activities and do much more to push PCD.

5.3.5 PCD mechanisms are strong enough in relation to coherence mechanisms of other policy sectors, or other pressure within broader policy process

Political backing is essential in a parliamentary setting. The capacity of members to raise awareness in their own political group and in other committees where they have substitute positions is important since it can trigger greater attention for PCD.

In this regard, Members interviewed all acknowledged that despite a wide political representation in the DEVE committee, consensus is relatively easy to reach in comparison with other committees: it makes common positions easier to defend. For instance in the INTA committee, views can be sharply opposite: from a protectionist approach to global liberalisation, and consensus is perhaps more difficult on issues like agriculture export and subsidies.

¹⁷ Over 40 reports issued by DEVE in the past ten years deal with PCD matters.

5.3.6 Degree to which combination of three different types of mechanisms takes place and how they support each other (policy statements, administrative and institutional mechanisms and knowledge and assessment mechanisms)

The policy basis for PCD at the European level are very clear and DEVE has a responsibility in promoting development objectives within the EP. It can do so in different ways but the most direct impact is through direct policy making with co-decision on development instruments (with the exclusion of the EDF so far¹⁸).

The more systematic promotion of PCD and monitoring of PCD commitments could perhaps be enhanced by the institutionalisation of this specific responsibility in the mandate of DEVE. However some argue on the contrary that it would place other committees in a more defensive position and eventually make the work of DEVE more difficult in surmounting obstacles in this area.

The link between DEVE and the NGDO community is almost systematically emphasised as a Committee asset. The main added value of the exchange is enhanced sensitisation and data collection and cases of incoherencies.

Overall finding for EQ 3 - summary box

There is common acknowledgment that the Committee is effective in implementing its objectives and pursuing its mandate. However since PCD is not specifically part of its responsibility, DEVE efficiency in this regard depends on the degree of initiatives taken by the Secretariat and the Members, the optimal use of the room of maneuver offered by the different procedures applicable and the technical strength of the PCD case advocated.

A growing number of reports issued by DEVE have increased the presence of the PCD issue in the EP plenary debate and contributed to inform on incoherence and tensions between development objectives and other internal policies, external relations or global challenges. DEVE also illustrated its capacity to directly influence policy decision making to achieve greater PCD by refusing that economic and development cooperation policies would be managed in a single policy framework with the same financial instrument in the recently adopted financial perspectives (2007-2013).

In order to promote PCD, political backing is fundamental for DEVE because all official positions of the Parliament become official only when they are the results of a vote in plenary, and can not simply emerge and be validated by a Committee. DEVE usually benefits from a wide consensus of its members to promote PCD but their capacity to foster alliances in their own political parties is harder to reach because it implies reconciling many diverging interest. Thus, the capacity of DEVE to mobilize its Secretariat capacity and use the relevant other sources of knowledge (including the NGO community data and analysis) is fundamental to make strong cases to promote PCD.

¹⁸ Which will remain the case unless the EDF becomes part of the EU budget.

5.4 Evaluation question 4

What are the key factors contributing to the success of the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms and their impact on intra-governmental PCD and why? What are the mechanisms' strengths and weaknesses in this respect?

5.4.1 Mechanisms impact positively on encouraging increasing levels of PCD

The recent example of the co-decision on the DCI is seen by many as an institutional success changing the mindset of the members and was an empowering experience (the feeling that 'DEVE did not let go' was expressed several times).

Awareness on the issue of PCD has increased with the numerous reports¹⁹ looking at policies in regard to development policy (EPAs development impact, trade and development, agriculture, aid effectiveness, ICT, environment) that trigger discussion in the plenary session of the EP.

Looking at the number of reports and hearings which are PCD related shows a growing initiative to follow up on this issue, even though there is no mechanism in place yet to ensure a systematic scrutiny of the legislative activity of the EP in order to optimize PCD.

The new financial instruments have been sealed in a new package and the discussion will only be reopened in another 7 years. DEVE has to move from co-decision to play a watchdog role on development objectives where PCD achievement could be a central feature.

5.4.2 The impact of the PCD mechanisms can be traced back to or linked to a limited number of factors

DEVE benefits from a strong consensus amongst the members transcending political parties which is an asset:

- to define common position on PCD matters;
- to mobilise Members for advocacy work in their own parties on PCD related matters.

The intensive work of committed members and the secretariat support for preparing strong informed cases were key features for achieving success on PCD matters. Experience showed that going into plenary without a very good technical knowledge on the subject which was at the heart of the PCD case on the contrary made DEVE run the risk of being discredited.

Some interviewees argue that DEVE should even be more intransigent on development objectives and should dare using their vote to mark their discontent²⁰. There is little if any chance that the final text (being a communication by the Commission or an international treaty) would actually be changed accordingly but it would be a strong political signal in favour of PCD commitments.

The use of the NGO community's capacity for data collection, case studies, and outreach towards the citizens combine with efficient access to media are elements that help DEVE advocating in favour of PCD commitments.

¹⁹ Since the beginning of the sixth term of the EP, over 40 % of DEVE's reports relate development objectives with another policy.

²⁰ The whole committee rejecting a text in plenary for instance

5.4.3 Incentives/disincentives perceived or experienced by officials that help or hinder the full application of the mechanisms

Amongst the disincentives for DEVE to further focus on promoting PCD capacity constraints were frequently mentioned although views varied on this point. Concerning capacity needs, two main issues were identified by interviewees: the time management and the focus of the Committee work.

The type of procedures used can help or hinder the Committee capacity to enhance PCD. On fisheries agreements for instance, the assent procedure – used for ratifying international treaty – only allows the parliament to ratify or decline which gives little room of manoeuvre, if any, to reach compromise. A political declaration can be annexed to call attention to some specific issues, including coherence issues, but it is not legally binding. Under these circumstances, DEVE can not do much to raise the issue of the consequences of fishery agreements on the level of revenue of fishermen living in the coastal regions in developing countries that are signing the agreement. On the other hand, co-decision is a powerful procedure that allows DEVE to bargain with the Council and reach compromise where the key elements the Committee puts forward are respected.

5.4.4 Monitoring & evaluation system contributing to ensuring that mechanisms remain well adapted to their task

The work of DEVE depends on how its competences fit into the institutional agenda:

- A legislative power with co-decision on development issues is a key moment to ensure that the core development objectives are respected (and not threatened by another logic like economic cooperation for instance as illustrated by the recent proposition of the Commission);
- An on-going budgetary power, although it looks rather unrealistic that DEVE could use the threat of refusing the discharge over a PCD argument (and if pursued, would ensure the Committee discredited itself more than it would promote PCD);
- The on-going monitoring of the implementation of the development objectives, but also of the PCD commitments and international commitments like the MDGs;
- The sensitisation of the wider public (hearings, international exposure, media outreach, dialogue with civil society organisations, experts), but also of other EU institutions (questions to Commission and Council).

In order to adapt to this continually evolving agenda, DEVE has to mobilise its members to chose the focus of the work the secretariat can deliver, especially with regards to own initiative activities.

5.4.5 Importance of political back-up as a key factor, relative to others, in ensuring PCD mechanisms have impact

The importance of political backing is important at various levels, from the president of the EP to the chair of the committee, from the sensitivity of the conference of presidents and the capacity of the DEVE members to mobilise their own political party on PCD matters.

Out of many combinations here are a few examples of different alliance schemes that can affect DEVE's possibility to support PCD:

- The president of the parliament and the president of AFET are from the same political group: a strong backing for AFET, instead of DEVE can therefore be expected when it comes to argue PCD at the highest political level (this can also happen with all other committees involved in PCD matters, including when they concern internal policies);
- The capacity of DEVE members to influence a consensual pro-PCD position in the political groups for the plenary vote / Conference of Presidents
- The profile of the Chair and the size of the political group he belongs too;
- The DEVE Members' profiles: their level of commitment to PCD; the links to the constituency (the capacity to explain the tensions between development and internal policies and the need for compromise; their special interest and their capacity to focus and a limited number of subjects and initiatives; the need for publicity towards their electorate and their capacity to prioritise PCD matters even though there are not necessarily attracting media, etc.)

5.4.6 Informal mechanisms – processes also impact (negatively/positively) on PCD

The constant dialogue and interactions with the NGO community and experts is regarded by most interviewees as a positive mechanism that helps DEVE building strong cases to advocate for PCD and act as a watchdog for development objectives.

Opinions vary on this point in the EC and the Council but there seems to be a limited culture in DEVE for systematically exchanging information with other institutions, including networking at individual level which is unfortunate. Overall, the feeling is that DEVE – and by extension, the EP, is not necessarily seen as a key actor in promoting PCD. Thus, in the DAC Peer Review or even in the Council conclusions regarding PCD the EP is not clearly mentioned as one of the key stakeholders. The recent study from CEPS²¹ shows the same trend in policy research: out of their six proposals for structural reforms and 31 specific recommendations, not one mentions the role of the EP or DEVE in improving PCD even though some recommendations are directly addressed to the EC. Given the on-going implementation of the PCD work plan, piloted by the EC, and the forthcoming elaboration of the first biennial PCD report it seems quite important to generate more regular inter-institutional contacts on this specific issue.

Overall finding for EQ 4 - summary box

Evidence suggests that there is a growing recognition of the positive role of DEVE in promoting PCD: by raising awareness, feeding back debate in the plenary session of the Parliament or successfully negotiating with the Council to defend the specificity of development objectives, the Committee is increasingly strengthening its actions to promote policy coherence for development.

However, since DEVE does not have a specific mandate to promote PCD, there is no mechanism in place to monitor its performance in this regard even though the Committee has to constantly adapt to the rapidly evolving Parliamentary agenda, and avoid discrediting its capacity to promote PCD by missing too many opportunities due to limited scrutinizing capacity or weak technical arguments.

PCD illustrates well a case of the interplay of political powers where the institutional rationale does not necessarily align with the political rationale and where political back up can hinder or enhance DEVE – and by extension the European Parliament - capacity to support PCD.

²¹ Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council – strategies for the way forward, CEPS, 2006.

Informal interaction with NGO and the use of experts' knowledge on PCD matters is recognized as an asset for the Committee to document examples of incoherence or strengthen pro PCD argumentation.

5.5 Evaluation question 5

What (and why) are the main factors influencing the sustainability of the selected intra-governmental PCD mechanisms?

5.5.1 PCD has become entrenched in government thinking and is becoming second nature to policy makers

Many interviewees confirmed that PCD does not mean much when introduced at a conceptual level but means a lot when incoherences become more visible. Examples illustrating the effect on peoples' lives are the ones that encourage mobilisation on PCD.

In the recent achievement of the Committee the struggle and final compromise over DCI has developed Members' awareness of their responsibility to promote PCD and defend development objectives, including towards the EC and the Council.

5.5.2 Government political commitment to PCD has been sustained over some time and is shared by the major political parties at the community level

Over the past years PCD has been systematically mentioned in the main policy frameworks. Some specific Council conclusions and a work plan have been adopted specifically on PCD and are currently being implemented. The new instrument for development cooperation (DCI) also mentions it so it will be monitored at the field level. The Finnish Presidency (July-Dec.2006) created a momentum on the issue by placing it on top of its agenda. Institutional visibility has been given to the issue in the past few years like it never had before.

On the other hand, some of the most obvious policies causing incoherence are not under co-decision which limits the capability of the Parliament to have impact (eg.: on subsidised agriculture products).

In addition, the impact of enhanced PCD on poverty reduction is difficult to trace so it will be difficult to monitor the impact of PCD on development objectives in the short run, which might affect the capacity for DEVE to monitor the issue.

5.5.3 Resources are available to keep PCD mechanisms operating as long as needed

The human resources of the DEVE Secretariat have increased in the past years, but more than the actual capacity constraint which seems to be a reality for all EP committees, the real challenge for DEVE is to organise its capacity according to set priorities that includes promoting PCD.

The advocacy capacity of DEVE members in the committees where they are substitutes and within their political parties represents an interesting leverage in favour of PCD if it is well used.

DEVE encounters specific constraints in terms of knowledge in other fields and policy areas than development that limit the capacity for DEVE to develop strong cases and advocate in favour of PCD.

5.5.4 Institutional status and capacity of the on-going mechanisms are clearly established

The PCD mandate is not explicitly integrated in the powers and responsibilities of DEVE. Views are divided over the opportunity to use the mid-legislature review to integrate this specific element could empower the Committee in monitoring PCD:

- If this specific role is institutionalised it empowers DEVE vis-à-vis other committees and partly resolves the issue of 'competences';
- The secretariat can organise a more systematic scrutiny of legislative and supervisory activities of the Parliament to spot systematically PCD cases and prepare solid argumentation to defend them.

Another avenue for ensuring the promotion of PCD is through the Committee capacity to monitor implementation. MEPs can not travel all the time to see the policies translated in the ground, but they get a few spotlights when they go on missions and from what they hear from their own contacts and networks. Combined with the analysis they receive from NGOs it represents a wealth of information to monitor PCD and feed back to the plenary on progress made.

5.5.5 Mechanisms have the capacity to adapt and renew themselves in order to meet new or changing demands

Besides the issue of capacity, both DEVE Members and Secretariat recognise that the organisation of the latter needs to adapt to the sequence of the tasks of the Committee (regulatory with the co-decision on development instruments; monitoring of implementation; budget supervision). Interviewees indicated that not only the promotion of PCD is time consuming and cannot possibly mobilise too much capacity, but it also has a better chance to impact if it is entrenched in the DEVE agenda. The example most frequently given is that now DEVE has a better chance to promote PCD in practice by ensuring effective monitoring of the implementation of the CSPs and the EC work plan since it is an opportunity to impact on other committees' reports and Council decisions is limited outside development.

Some interviewed confirmed that there are signs of enhanced dialogue with other committees (ex: INTA on EPA), but the idea that a lot of informal mechanisms could still be developed is generally accepted.

5.5.6 Decreasing opposition to the PCD mechanisms and their continued existence

The Development Committee institutional basis is as strong as any of the other 19 committees in the EP and there is no reason why it would be discontinued. New staff has recently been hired and the Committee responsibilities are regularly extended (for instance by being the institutional contact to other parliamentary bodies like the Pan African Parliament).

A recent positive move confirms the role that the EP and more specifically DEVE intend to play in monitoring development policy, including PCD. A letter of intent between the two EC Commissioners for development and external relations and the President of the Parliament was signed in order to render possible contact with the EC at an early phase for informal dialogue on the country strategy papers or on all matters in relation to the DCI before it is validated by the Council.

Overall finding for EQ 5 - summary box

None of the interviewees felt that the sustainability of the Committee was jeopardized but many indicated that it needed to focus its activities and reorganise the activities of its Secretariat to counter the constraints due to limited resources. The challenge is to allocate them to limited set of priorities that would include PCD.

Even though PCD has a clear legal basis in the European policy framework, it is not very appealing at the conceptual level but becomes quite meaningful when examples of incoherence are made visible, which is the case when other policies interfere with development objectives. The paradox is that DEVE has no direct influence and limited knowledge on all these issues which fall outside its specific field of competence. The responsibility of DEVE Members to sustain political momentum in favor of PCD is fundamental in this regard, as well as the ability to capture data and related knowledge from outside (like NGO analysis) in addition to what their own Secretariat can produce in order to feed back into the debate with qualitative and quantitative arguments in favor of enhancing PCD

The recognition of DEVE capacity to promote PCD will also be linked to its performance in monitoring the implementation by the Commission of commitments taken at the European level, and also by being able to follow up to some extent the implementation of the cooperation in partner countries even though the direct impact of PCD on poverty reduction is tricky to trace.

6 Main findings on evaluation criteria

6.1 Relevance

The Development Committee is *de facto* promoting development objectives in the European Parliament policy debate. However it is not specifically mandated to do so and the weight of development is questionable when it comes to make pro-development choices over internal EU policies or external relations. DEVE is however clearly a relevant mechanism to use in promoting PCD. The Committee's institutional responsibility to co-decide on development policy is a powerful tool and it does help to promote development interests in other areas. On the other hand, other procedures DEVE can use are less adequate to advocate for PCD even though this is a priority for the European Parliament.

6.2 Effectiveness

The Committee is effective in pursuing its mandate but since PCD is neither a specific responsibility nor a power of DEVE its promotion depends a lot from the Committee Secretariat and Members' initiatives in this sense. The analysis of the reports issued by the Committee in the past ten years proves a growing interest for PCD issues, with a growing number of texts that link development with another policy area (trade, agriculture, environment, energy, etc.). However, the Committee is limited by the fact that it is primarily – and only – responsible for its own area of competence (in this case development) and eventually gets little room of manoeuvre at the institutional level when it comes to other policy areas. This situation remains a paradox when precisely promoting PCD is about reviewing the coherence of *all policy* with development objectives.

6.3 Efficiency

The recent debate on the financial instruments of the EU in the field of external relations illustrated the capacity of DEVE to influence policy decision to achieve greater PCD by defending development goals and working methods. It also contributed to raise awareness on the example of incoherence and to highlight the interconnections of internal policies and external relations and development objectives, both in the European Parliament and for a wider public. However, its limited capacity to make strong cases to advocate for PCD and the reliance on wide political backing limits its efficiency in promoting development objectives outside the Committee compound. On-going exchange between the Committee and the NGO community helps MEPs to receive data and analysis on PCD issues, but the systematic scrutiny of Parliament legislative work and regular dialogue with other EU institutions on this specific objective is still lacking.

6.4 Impact

In different ways (legislation, awareness, policy debate), the Committee manages to promote PCD. However, it would be helpful if other institutions would take the role of DEVE in PCD more seriously as policy research and interviews tend to show that the EP in general and DEVE in particular are not yet seen as key stakeholders in promoting PCD at the European level. More regular intra and inter institutional exchange of information to follow on the implementation of PCD in practice could strengthen DEVE capacity to further promote PCD. The Committee also relies a lot on the good will of its Members to proactively engage for PCD. Whereas there is evidence that they are quite committed there is the contingent risk that the institutional and political rationales they defend conflict with other positions and does not enable them to get the necessary support to push their views through at the plenary level.

6.5 Sustainability

Coherence for development is mentioned in the EU Treaty and the importance of the principle has been reinforced by its systematic mention in all recent policy frameworks related to development. Besides there is no sign that the institutional existence of DEVE is under threat so sustainability of the mechanism is not an issue. However, PCD is not a priority for DEVE and using the possibility to revise the Committee mandate²² to integrate a specific reference to the promotion of PCD in DEVE responsibilities is generally accepted as a move that would help the Committee to ensure sustained effort and better performance in promoting PCD.

7 Conclusions

7.1 Main conclusions from EQs

The main conclusion that emerges from this study is that despite the fact that PCD is not *de jure* part of DEVE's mandate; the Committee promotes it *de facto*. It does so at the European level by creating awareness on the issue, by defending objectives that fall under its competence in the policy debate and activities of the EP, and through co-decision.

Its actions are centred on its own area of competence (development) which limits its technical knowledge on other policies and the procedural possibilities to promote

²² An opportunity which is available at every start of a new legislature and half legislature.

development goals in other areas. Thus the political initiative of the Members to promote PCD in an articulated way is a key element for its success, together with the Secretariat's capacity to prepare strong arguments (by scrutinising reports elaborated by other committees, centralising technical knowledge to elaborate strong argument on PCD issues, etc.). The inclusion of promoting PCD as specific responsibility for DEVE to monitor it could strengthen the Committee legitimacy to more systematically perform and monitor it.

Since development goals are not necessarily predominant in the policy decision making process, political backing that goes outside the Committee itself are crucial to pursue PCD advocacy. Alliances within the political groups, their influence in Committees where they act as substitute and their capacity to mobilise the EP Conference of Presidents are important in this respect. The possibility of DEVE to monitor PCD in practice is limited by the fact that the Commission is the institution in charge, but the high international exposure²³ of the Committee and its Members is an asset that should be well utilised in this regard (field visits, dialogue with counterpart). Innovating modalities for inter-institutional dialogue is also suggested to be one way to explore. In terms of awareness and access to data, the information accessible through the NGO community is particularly interesting to give visibility to cases of incoherence and make PCD a very real issue that goes beyond conceptual debate.

7.2 Main issues, trends and challenges that should be discussed in the synthesis report

Alignment of PCD ambition with capacity available. Given the fact that the staff of the DEVE capacity are neither likely to particularly grow over the next years nor the development objectives to overrule internal policy matters it is important for DEVE to match its ambition according to its capacity (for instance on organising the monitoring of CSPs). The possibility to focus on PCD matters could therefore be enhanced if it becomes an 'umbrella' objective for the Committee.

Optimal use of networking and external knowledge. The political and ethical consensus amongst members that DEVE benefits from is an important asset that helps in defining common positions rather quickly to push for PCD. DEVE members are amongst the more exposed internationally and build up a certain legitimacy from their regular visits to the field and dialogue with Southern actors. They can also emphasize PCD messages in their relations to the NGO community that can relay them in their own advocacy work.

Enhance intra-institutional dialogue. An informal RELEX pool within the EP could be created where all committees dealing with external relations would meet regularly to discuss and share information. Such an informal mechanism would be a very interesting forum to address PCD. Besides, in order to monitor PCD commitments and fully participate in the work plan, the Committee could pro-actively engage in more regular exchange with the services involved in the EC.

²³ In comparison to other Committee in the EP

Annex 1: List of principal official source documents

- The 'Maastricht Treaty' (the treaty on European Union) (1992)
<http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf>
- The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
<http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamfinalact.pdf>
- The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000 – revised 2005)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf#zoom=100
- The European Community's Development Policy – Statement by the Council and the Commission, November 2000
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/index_en.htm
- The EU Consensus on Development (2005)
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_046/c_04620060224en00010019.pdf
- EC Communication, COM (2005) 134, *Policy coherence for development – Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals* – 12 April 2005
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/communications/docs/communication_134_en.pdf
- GAERC conclusions, 23-24 May 2005
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/85008.pdf
- EC Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006) 335/1, *Policy coherence for development – Work programme 2006-2007*, 7 March 2006
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/recherche.cfm?CL=fr>
- GAERC conclusions, 10-11 April 2006
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/89219.pdf
- GAERC conclusions, 16-16 October 2006
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91351.pdf
- EP rules of procedures, Annex VI 'Powers and responsibility', 29 January 2004.

Annex 2: Abbreviations used in the report

3Cs	Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence
ACP	Countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
AFET	Committee on Foreign Affairs
AidCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DCI	The instrument for development cooperation
DEVE	Development Committee of the European Parliament
DG	Directorate General
DG Relex	Directorate General for External Relations
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF	European Development Fund
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
EU-HES	European Union Heads of Evaluation Services
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
HoD	Head of Department
ICEI	Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
INTA	Committee on International Trade
JC	Judgement Criteria
JPA	Joint Parliamentary Assembly
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MS	Member State

NGDO	Non Governmental Development Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-State Actor
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TEC	Treaty on the European Community
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
ToR	Terms of References

Annex 3: Persons met

Van Hecken, Guido	Secretariat EP DEVE Committee
Caprile, Ana	Secretariat EP DEVE Committee
Maclaughan, Anna	Secretariat EP DEVE Committee
Schmidt, Fithjof	Member EP DEVE Committee
Galher, Michael	Member EP DEVE Committee
Wijkman, Anders	Member EP DEVE Committee
Van der Bergh, Max	Member EP DEVE Committee
Pribaz, Donatella	Secretariat EP Committee INTA
Earle, Michael	Official working for the Green Group, EP
Baum, Alexander	'EU and ACP Institutional relations and civil society' Unit, DG DEV
Schneider, Heike	'Forward looking studies and policy coherence' Unit, DG DEV
Moreau, Françoise	'Forward looking studies and policy coherence' Unit, DG DEV
Braunsein, Virginia	'Forward looking studies and policy coherence' Unit, DG DEV
Iltis, Renée	'EU and ACP Institutional relations and civil society' Unit, DG DEV
Bagur, Luc	'Co-ordination and organization strategies' Unit, AIDCO
Pennington, Martin	'Relations with EU institutions, international organisations and donors' Unit, AIDCO
Jones, Guilim	'Trade relations and EPA negotiations with Central Africa, DG Trade
Garcia Perez, Mercedes	EU Council, Secretariat
Consolo, Olivier	CONCORD
Ulmer, Karin	APRODEV
Van Drimmelen, Rob	APRODEV
Sohet, Karine	APRODEV
Lappalainen, Rilli	Finnish NGO Forum

Annex 4: Country profile

1. List of Policy Statements and Principal Sources (Government documents):

1. The 'Maastricht Treaty' (the treaty on European Union) (1992)
<http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf>
2. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
<http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamfinalact.pdf>
3. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000 – revised 2005)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf#zoom=100
4. The European Community's Development Policy – Statement by the Council and the Commission, November 2000
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/index_en.htm
5. The EU Consensus on Development (2005)
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_046/c_04620060224en00010019.pdf
6. EC Communication, COM (2005) 134, *Policy coherence for development – Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millenium Development Goals* – 12 April 2005
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/communications/docs/communication_134_en.pdf
7. GAERC conclusions, 23-24 May 2005
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/85008.pdf
8. EC Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2006) 335/1, *Policy coherence for development – Work programme 2006-2007*, 7 March 2006
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/recherche.cfm?CL=fr>
9. GAERC conclusions, 10-11 April 2006
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/89219.pdf
10. GAERC conclusions, 16-16 October 2006
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91351.pdf

2. To what extent is coherence an explicit objective of MS?

The 2000 **Development Policy Statement** reiterates the objectives of Article 177 and 178 EC²⁴ and highlights the need for improved coherence among the EC/EU policies. In theory, the legal texts and the policy statement refer to all internal and external policies of the European Union.

The **Cotonou Agreement** has an even stronger coherence Article (12): The EC is legally bound to inform the ACP states of all its policy intentions if it affects the poverty objective of the CPA and the different countries: *'towards this end, the Commission shall communicate simultaneously to the secretariat of the ACP States its proposal for such measures. Where necessary, a request for information may also take place on the initiative of the ACP States. At their request (ACP), consultations shall be held promptly so that account may be taken of their concerns as to the impact of those measures before any final decision is made'*.

Although the **new Constitution** is not adopted, it might however be useful to keep an eye on the legal provisions: Consistence (Art. III-115; Art III-292(3);) has basically replaced the term coherence. It means that the external and internal policies should be consistent rather than coherent with the development objectives of poverty eradication.

What is new in the 2005 **European Consensus** is the inclusion of different articles (35-38 and 109) which are specifically about coherence. Article 35 connects the need for policy coherence for development to

²⁴ The development objectives of the European treaties are stated in Article 177 of the TEC: (i) Sustainable economic and social development of developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;(ii) the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and (iii) the campaign against poverty in the developing countries, while **Article 178 of TEC states: The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.** (Article 130v & 178, Treaty on the European Union 1992, 1997 and consolidated TEU 2002)

achieving the Millennium Development Goals: *'It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims.'* The other three articles contain more concrete commitments on issues including trade capacity building, removing trade distortions, security and development, and the environment. Article 109 states that the Commission and Member States will prepare a rolling Work Programme on the implementation of the May 2005 conclusions on policy coherence for development, building on the **EC Communication on Policy Coherence for Development** (COM(2005) 335) and indicates that the Commission will reinforce its existing instruments such as the impact assessment and explore new instruments to be put in place in order to implement PCD commitments. In its **May 2005 conclusions**, the **GAERC** took note of the Communication and asked for some follow-up, notably through a bi-annual reporting on the implementation on the commitments contained in the Communication.

Following these commitments the EC prepared a **work programme for 2006-2007** defining concrete steps in order to promote PCD within the twelve policy areas defined in the EC Communication. The **GAERC conclusions in 2006** (both in April and in October) took note of the work programme and made some specific recommendations in order to better integrate development concerns in the Council decision-making process.

3. Indication of when PCD became an issue:

1992 (Maastricht Treaty)

4. Who is responsible for ensuring the completion of these objectives?

There is no single body, unit and/or person responsible for coherence in the European Commission. Several of mechanisms and processes include various elements of coherence (see below).

The EU institutional context is complex and it is thus important to introduce it:

European Commission Directorates General dealing with external relations

DG Development: is responsible for i) development policy and promoting development goals within other Community policies and ii) relations to the ACP. In other words, it is in charge of app. 3 billion euro annually (app. half of the total external EC budget). The Commissioner for Development is also responsible for ECHO.

ECHO: is responsible for the EC's humanitarian assistance (and soon all food security/food aid/food management programmes).

DG Relex: is responsible for relations to all non-ACP and non-candidate countries. It is headed by the Commissioner for External Relations.

AIDCO/EuropeAid: is in charge of the implementation of programmes (the whole project cycle besides programming). Aidco is under the responsible of the Board which consisted of all the external (RELEX) Commissioners.

DG Trade: DG trade is responsible for trade relations to third countries.

DG Enlargement: Is responsible for all candidate and potential candidate countries.

The European Parliament

Different standing committees deal with external relations in the European Parliament besides the Committee on Development (DEVE): the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and indirectly the Committee on Budget. None of these committees have a specific PCD mandate listed under their powers and responsibilities, but obviously the DEVE Committee is following this issue, and 'coherence' is often mentioned in the reports addressing development issues in relation to other policies (immigration, agriculture, trade, etc.).

The European Council

The recently carried CEPS study on PCD in the EU Council (CEPS; 2006) indicates that 'decision-making in the Council must navigate the nine sector-divided ministerial formations and numerous subordinate bodies where the majority of decision are taken. The study looks at the twelve thematic areas identified in the May 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD: trade, environment, climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, the social dimension of globalisation, employment and decent work, migration, research and innovation, the

information society, transport and energy. PCD varies according to which Council working party, Coreper and Council formation are in charge. The GAERC is recognised as an important advocate for PCD despite uneven contribution to this matter.

5. Characterization of institutional architecture for PCD

The European Commission

CSPs/RSPs

A first programming framework common to all regions where the Commission operates has been developed and applied in 2000-2001. This framework contains a requirement to look at the policy mix aspect. Each CSP should thus include a section concerning the EU policy mix. This consists of identifying linkages between external assistance and other Community policies, resources and instruments in fields such as trade, fisheries, agriculture, conflict prevention, food security, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (EC Guidelines, 2001). In 2006, the Commission has published a new common programming framework that explicitly includes a section on the impact of other policies on development goals²⁵. PCD is also included as an issue to assess in geographical evaluations of CSPs/RSPs. The CSPs/RSPs could thus be considered as a PCD mechanism in itself. However the new common programming framework is only being applied to ACP programming, currently under-going. There is probably not enough material to assess it at this stage since it would be interesting to have the whole cycle included : programming, reviews and evaluations or at least part of it.

Country teams

In relation to the CSPs, the Commission establishes country teams that undertake all programming and reviews with regard to a specific country or region. This is a technical forum that brings together all DGs and EC officials concerned with cooperation in a country. Their task is to coordinate the Commission's interests and ensure policy coherence. They do the coherence analysis for their country of concern and are thus the primary instrument for ensuring that the European Union adheres to a consistent and coherent policy towards third countries.

Impact assessment

An impact assessment process was set up by the Commission in 2002 within the framework of the "better regulation" package and the **European Sustainable Development Strategy** which instigated several concrete actions to simplify the regulatory environment and improve the way the Commission designs policy. Replacing previous single-sector impact assessments, the new process provides the European institutions with an integrated methodology by which to assess policy impact. As now designed, the impact assessment process functions as a tool for improving the coherence of measures under preparation. *'It associates all relevant Commission services to the analysis, and consults potentially affected stakeholders as regards different scenarios for the policy goals to be achieved'* (COM/2005/0134 final). Through the impact assessment process, the Commission identifies the likely positive and negative economic, environmental and social effects of proposed policy actions, and outlines potential synergies and trade-offs in achieving competing objectives, thus enabling informed political judgments to be made about the proposal. The process takes place in two stages. First a preliminary assessment is completed. Then, if necessary, an extended impact assessment is done. Preliminary assessment is required for all proposals submitted in the context of the annual policy strategy or work programme that the Commission adopted the year before. Key elements of the assessment process are thorough consultation with different stakeholders and coordination across the different Commission services. The assessment process was expected to be fully operational for 2004/05. Commission services are currently improving the process. The last two Council conclusions refer to impact assessment as the European tool for promoting policy coherence for development and called on the Commission to further reinforce it.²⁶ This mechanism is currently being assessed.

²⁵ COM(2006) 88, *Increasing the impact of aid – A common framework for drafting country strategy papers and joint multiannual programming*, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0088en01.pdf

²⁶ *Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council*, 16 and 17 December 2004 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf and *External Relations Council Conclusions: Accelerating Progress towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*, Brussels, 24 May 2005,

European Commission working groups

Within the Commission, informal working groups exist for all geographic areas and on many thematic topics. These may take the form of informal inter-service (i.e. inter-DG) groups, for instance in the area of trade and development. Proposals that can have an impact on development are discussed in this context before being circulated among all DGs through the inter-service consultation. An inter-service working group has been formalised very recently (September 2006) in order to follow up on the EC Work programme on policy coherence for development 2006-2007. The EC work programme and the bi-annual reporting will in themselves constitute a mechanism once there is a sufficient basis to assess them.

The inter-service consultation

The inter-service consultation process is the institutional consequence of the principle of collegiality of the European Commission. All decisions are taken by the European Commission as a collegial body, which means that all DGs have to be involved in the decision-making process. EC proposals (draft Communications, etc.) are thus circulated to the other DGs through the inter-service consultation, which allow other DGs to make comments, observations and eventually negative opinions if they disagree with the proposals. This consultation is made at the technical level. If disagreements remain, they are thus solved at the political level among Commissioners. This mechanism is used by each DG to promote its own goals and policy and thus by DG Development to promote policy coherence for development although there is no specific mandate for it.

The Committee on Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament

The Committee on Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament is responsible for promoting, implementing and monitoring the development and cooperation policy of the Union, matters relating to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement and relations with other relevant bodies. It also organises the European Parliament's involvement in election observation missions, when appropriate in cooperation with other relevant committees and delegations. Though it has no specific institutional mandate to promote policy coherence for development, it does refer to coherence issues in various debates and reports.²⁷

The EU Council

Since EU policies and generally (co)-decided in the Council, the institution is of vital importance for ensuring policy coherence in general and PCD in particular. A recent study has analysed whether the policy-making process in the EU Council allow for "development related" inputs and where these processes are found to be wanting through studies conducted in each of the twelve thematic areas identified in the May 2005 Council conclusions²⁸. Some recommendations of this study have been taken into account in the GAERC October 2006 conclusions.

6. List of Identified PCD Mechanisms / Characterisation	Particular Characteristics²⁹	Actors involved:³⁰
6.1 Explicit Policy Statements A - Maastricht Treaty (art. 177 and 178) B - EU draft constitutional treaty (art III-316) C - Development Policy Statement and its successor: the EU Consensus on Development.	All Group 2	EC, EU Member States, EU Council,

http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/84945.pdf

²⁷ In particular, the Report on the Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the European Community's development policy, *The European Community's Development Policy*, Committee on Development and Cooperation (2001).

²⁸ CEPS, *Policy coherence for Development in the EU Council – Strategies for the way forward*. Brussels, 2006.

²⁹ For an explanation of the concepts used in 6 ('Type of Mechanism' and 'Particular Characteristics'), please refer to the enclosed Explanatory Note.

³⁰ Used abbreviations: CS = civil society; Par = Parliament; Cab = Cabinet; NGOs; PS = Private Sector; PM = Government Policy Makers; Acad = Academics; others

D - Commission's communication (2005) 134 on policy coherence for development E - European Council conclusions		ACP countries
6.2 Administrative/Institutional A - CSP/RSP (new) B - Country teams C – Inter-service working group (new) D – Inter-service consultation E - Development Committee (European Parliament)	A-D: Group 4 F: Group 2	EC, PM, Par
6.3 Knowledge Input and Assessment A - Impact assessment (already being done)	A : Group 4	EC

7. External Opinions:
The 2002 DAC/Peer Review makes three general recommendations on PCD in the EU institutions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>'Review the coherence of internal Community policies with development objectives. The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) offers a context in which to do this, but the analytical capacity and resources for such work are lacking both in the field and in Brussels;</i> • <i>Propose initiatives for approval by EU Member States for strengthening the positive impact of internal Community policies on development policy;</i> • <i>Make full use of the policy coherence mechanisms by providing stronger linkages and feedback between the CSP process, Interservice Quality Support Group, Evaluation unit, and Court of Auditors'</i> (OECD/DAC 2002: 17).

8. Contacts		
Francoise Moreau, Head of Unit, Forward looking studies and policy coherence, DG Development, francoise.moreau@cec.eu.int	Virginia Braunstein, Forward looking studies and policy coherence, DG Development, Virginia.braunstein@cec.eu.int	Guido van Hecken, Official at the EP Secretariat, Deputy Head of the Development Committee, guido.vanhecken@europarl.europa.eu

Annex 5: Description of the mechanism

Composition

The Committee on Development is one of the 20 standing committees of the European Parliament. In the on-going legislature³¹ it has 34 Members (out of a total of 732 Members) which means that the Development Committee is a medium-sized committee³². Members are drawn from the political groups in a way that reflects the political balance of the Parliament as a whole. The choice of a particular Member to go to one committee rather than to another is mainly based on personal preference, but has to be finally validated by her / his Political Group. The majority of Members of the European Parliament (MEP) serve on one committee as a full member and on another as a substitute.

The formal office-holders (“Bureau”) within the committee are its chair and three vice-chairs³³.

A significant role in the committee is played by the Group coordinators. Each Political Group designates a coordinator as its spokesperson for each committee. The coordinators meet to discuss the committee’s agenda and outstanding political problems before full discussion in the committee. They also share out the workload among the Members of their own Group and help to establish the voting position of the Group, both in committee and in plenary.

The Committee is served by a Secretariat of permanent civil servants. The Secretariat:

- organises the daily work of the committee,
- provides background studies and notes in response to requests notably from the Chair,
- helps Members with background information and in drafting reports, and
- manages legislative planning at committee level.

It also acts as Co-Secretariat for the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and its three standing committees³⁴.

Regulating EU development cooperation

One of the main roles of the Committee on Development, like other committees, is in the adoption of European legislation in its area of competence. The legal base for legislation in the development policy area is Article 179 of the Treaties, which provides that such legislation is to be decided according to the co-decision procedure, which means that the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers together adopt legislation proposed by the Commission.

There are numerous pieces of legislation in the form of regulations governing EU action in development cooperation. They fall into two broad categories: Thematic regulations cover actions in particular sectors of development cooperation, and the geographic regulations that govern development cooperation activities with specific regions of the world. The geographical

³¹ Sixth legislature: 2004-2009

³² The largest Committee is AFET with 78 Members, and the smallest is the Petitions Committee with 25 members.

³³ elected at the committee’s constituent meeting at the start and half way point of each legislature

³⁴ Many of the Development Committee’s members are also members of the ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly. DEVE and the Assembly share the same secretariat and work together in monitoring the implementation of partnership agreements with ACP (Africa – Caribbean – Pacific) countries.

regulation covering regions of interest to the Committee on Development is the recently adopted regulation for the instrument on development cooperation (DCI).

There is no regulation covering cooperation with the 78 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific that comprise the ACP Group since it is based on instruments outside the community structure (the Cotonou Agreement) and funding comes from the intergovernmental European Development Fund (EDF)³⁵.

Organisation of the Parliament's legislative work:

- The Commission submits a legislative proposal to the Parliament; the "committee responsible" is instructed to draw up a report and appoints a rapporteur (i.e. a member of the Committee who is entrusted with the task of drafting the Committee's report). One or more other committees may be asked to deliver an opinion to the Committee responsible.
- The committee responsible examines the rapporteur's draft report, together with the amendments tabled by other MEPs and the opinions forwarded by other Committees, and adopts a final report.
- The political groups examine the report from their own political standpoint and decide which additional amendments should be tabled in Plenary.
- Finally, the resolution contained in the report is discussed and adopted in plenary session, thus becoming the position of the European Parliament. It usually suggests changes to the Commission's proposal in the form of amendments.
- Under the co-decision procedure, the legislative proposal is submitted to the Council at the same time as to the Parliament. The legislative text can be adopted only if there is agreement between the Council and the Parliament on each amendment. Only then is new "European legislation" adopted.
- Agreement can be reached in the first, second or third reading. If no agreement is reached, the legislation is not adopted.

Budgetary powers

As part of its remit the Committee closely monitors the EU general budget and contributes to it inter alia in the form of amendments to the budget lines concerning developing countries. In the inter-institutional procedure between the European Parliament, Council and Commission, Parliament has the last word on the budget lines for development cooperation. It scrutinises the budget insofar as trade with developing countries is concerned, and - last, but not least - has a close look at the administrative budget of Commission's departments dealing with development cooperation.

The Committee is involved in the preparation of the position of Parliament for the negotiations with Council and Commission during the whole budgetary exercise. The Members, in particular the rapporteur, negotiate the DEVE amendments with the Budget Committee and inside the political groups. The Committee - guided by its rapporteur - monitors the implementation of the budget by the Commission and makes sure that the money is disbursed as agreed by Parliament. The discharge procedure is led by the Committee on Budgetary Control. The Committee on Development can give opinions.

³⁵ The Cotonou Agreement as primarily law is part of the regulatory framework. The Agreement, as well as the revisions occurring afterwards, needs the approval of the European Parliament (assent procedure). The Parliament does not participate on the negotiation of such agreements, but it can express its views through resolutions.

Only about half of the total amount comes from the EC budget³⁶. The other part is accounted for by the European Development Fund (EDF). Although the EDF is scrutinised by the Committee (including discharge procedure), the European Parliament has no power to influence expenditure under the EDF which is provided directly by the Member States and it is not part of the Community budget.

Members actively contributed to the Financial Perspectives of the EU for the years 2007-2013, which set out spending targets for each budget chapter for the next seven years.

Supervisory powers

A very important function of the European Parliament and its standing committees is the exercise of supervision over the executive, i.e. the European Commission, as well as over some aspects of the work of the EU Council and the European Central Bank.

DEVE exercises this function through different instruments:

- hearings of and regular meetings with the Commissioner for development cooperation and humanitarian aid³⁷ and;
- meetings with the Council Presidency;
- Questions to the Council and to the Commission;
- Hearings of experts (usually public they can deal with the subjects of reports in progress).

Promoting democracy and human rights

Development is the only component of external relations where the European Parliament has co-decision powers. As well as exercising its legislative, supervisory and budgetary powers, the Committee on Development plays an important role in EU relations with developing countries. These relations include political dialogue on democratisation processes, human rights and good governance.

The “European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights” was created in 1994 by an initiative of the European Parliament. This instrument is aimed more specifically at NGOs and is focused on strengthening civil society. The main advantage of the EIDHR is that it can be used without the host government’s consent or where other EC programmes are not available because cooperation with the government has been suspended. When adopting the regulation through co-decision, the EP asked the Commission to keep it regularly informed about the implementation of the initiative. It continues now with a new instrument called the “**European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights**”, which has just been adopted.

Besides, the Committee closely monitors the political situation in developing countries and especially follows the EU’s relationship with those ACP countries with which the European Commission conducts political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

For a closer follow-up, the Human Rights Group of the Committee on Development is in charge of monitoring and raising awareness of the human rights situation in developing countries, in close cooperation with the Human Rights Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee,

³⁶ Of the total EC ODA in 2004.

³⁷ In addition, DEVE was associated to the hearings organised for the Commissioner for External Trade, Peter Mandelson, and for the Commissioner on External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner.

especially in case of serious breaches of human rights. This is done through **Human Rights Slots**, special hearings organised every second month as part of committee meetings. The Committee may exercise its right to table resolutions or to initiate a debate in plenary.

Committee Members regularly participate in European Parliament ad hoc delegations to developing countries, which are either **fact-finding or electoral observation missions**. These report back and formulate recommendations to the European Parliament on a given political situation. Apart from these, the Development Committee can send, twice a year, its own delegations to places of special interest. European Parliament or Development Committee delegations are sent to countries involved in post-war reconstruction, to crises zones or to post-disaster rehabilitation areas.

ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly

As well as exercising its legislative, supervisory and budgetary powers, the Committee on Development plays an important role in EU relations with developing countries and, in particular, with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Regions (ACP).

The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) is a democratic, parliamentary institution set in the framework of ACP-EU cooperation. It aims to promote and defend democratic processes. It is so far the only institution of its kind in the world and has proved to be a valuable tool for building parliamentary capacity-building.

The representatives of the 78 ACP states, who should be parliamentarians from the 78 ACP national parliaments, meet their 78 European Parliament counterparts in plenary session for one week twice a year. The European Delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly is not formally linked to the Development Committee but most members of the Committee on Development are also Members of the JPA, and both bodies deal with similar issues and share the same concerns.